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MODELING UCC DRAFTING
A. Brooke Overby*
[T]his should be borne in mind, that it is neither safe nor
conducive to concord rashly to do away with those things
that have been handed down with the authority of the past
and that long usage and general agreement have confirmed.
Nor should anything be changed except under pressure of
necessity or for evident benefit.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The wake left by the 1990 revisions to Articles 3 and 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code) indicates that the UCC
is approaching, if not wholly immersed in, a midlife crisis alluded to
some years back by Grant Gilmore.2 The alleged pro-bank, anti-
consumer bias of those revisions and their inefficient treatment of
many payment law issues have led not only to remonstrations on the
substantive provisions of those articles,3 but also to demands for a
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. The author thanks
Paul Barron, Michael Collins, Kirsten Engel, Shael Herman, Dennis Patterson, Larry
Ponoroff, Keith Werhan, and Mark Wessman for their comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.
1. On Mending the Peace of the Church, in THE ESSENTIAL ERASMuS 331,378 (John
P. Dolan trans., 1983).
2. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977) ("The most difficult
period in the life of a statute-as in the life of a human being-is middle age. Admittedly
the statute is no longer what it once was but there is [I life in the old dog yet."); see also
Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REv. 461, 471-72 (1967)
[hereinafter Gilmore, Obsolescence] ("[W]e shall no doubt be surprised by what happens
to the Uniform Commercial Code between now and the year 2000.").
3. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Revision of U.C.C. Articles Three and Four: A
Process Which Excluded Consumer Protection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L.
REV. 827, 827 (1992) (noting that the revision "represents a major failure in process");
Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 679, 682-84 (1991) (discussing impact of revisions
on consumers); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform
Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83,
106-20 (1993) (critiquing anticonsumer aspects of Article 4); Edward Rubin, Efficiency,
Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REv. 551, 592 (1991)
[hereinafter Rubin, Efficiency and Equity] (concluding that the revisions of Articles 3 and
4 are "inequitable" and economically inefficient); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a
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critical reexamination of the entire process by which the UCC is
drafted.4 The principal targets in this frontal assault on the Code are
the UCC's sponsors-specifically the American Law Institute (ALI)
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL)-and their perceived willingness to cater to
powerful interest groups in the drafting process. Harsh edicts call for
those institutions to reform the UCC drafting process,5 undergo
significant institutional reform,6 or be abolished.' A small number
of states have non-uniformly enacted revised Articles 3 and 4,8 which
evidences the commercial law community's reception of these
criticisms. In addition, scholars have begun to scrutinize the structure
and products of quasi legislatures such as the ALI and NCCUSL, as
well as their susceptibility to interest group pressures.'
Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3
and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 743, 781-88 (1993) [hereinafter Rubin, Thinking Like a
Lawyer] (arguing that Articles 3 and 4 reflect a failure of the legislative process); Edward
L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons from
the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1251, 1275 (1989) (concluding that consumers are
marginalized in the uniform state laws process).
Defenses of the failure of revised Articles 3 and 4 to address aggressively consumer
issues are rare. See, eg., Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process
and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405, 412-16 (1991) [hereinafter Miller, Study in Process]
(defending anticonsumer stance of Articles 3 and 4); William D. Warren, UCC Drafting:
Method and Message, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 811,821-22 (1993) (arguing that uniform laws
process does not function well with consumer issues).
4. See Patchel, supra note 3; Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3; Rubin,
Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3; see also Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky,
Drafting Commercial Law for the New Millennium: Will the Current Process Suffice?, 26
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 551,553 (1993) (questioning whether nineteenth century governmental
theory ought to dictate twenty-first century commercial law).
5. See generally Patchel, supra note 3, at 156-57 (arguing that the drafting process
should be more accessible); Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3 (discussing
problems with the current drafting process and its lack of consumer participation).
6. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 161-62 (suggesting that the NCCUSL ought to
reconsider its role as protector of state autonomy); Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra
note 3, at 787 (tracing inefficient and inequitable results in Articles 3 and 4 to structure).
7. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 788.
8. Id. at 784. In an earlier volume of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review,
Professor Rubin recounted his letter writing campaign against revised Articles 3 and 4.
Id. at 782-85. Consumer group lobbyists in California were able to parlay Rubin's
objections into several nonuniform amendments to Articles 3 and 4. See Gail K.
Hillebrand, UCC Articles 3 and 4 in the California Legislature: A New Focus on Consumer
Protection in Uniform Law Proposals, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 123 (1993)
[hereinafter Hillebrand, A New Focus].
9. See generally Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1996) (examining whether the NCCUSL's
proposals lead to efficient uniformity); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political
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Underlying these complaints is the suggestion that the drafters
gravely erred in failing to produce an efficient, policy-driven, and pro-
consumer piece of legislation. The complaints imply that the revisions
are bad law because they failed to make changes to the UCC that
would have been in the "public interest" or because the changes that
were made contravene the public interest. The inevitable conclusion
is that the process which generated such revisions must be corrupt.
Although born in the revisions to Articles 3 and 4,10 the challenge
to the NCCUSL and ALI has great significance as the UCC continues
along a journey of revision and expansion" that inevitably will
transform the Code. Yet, while commentaries on the most recent
revisions to Articles 3 and 4 and on the revision projects in progress
have become legal scholarship's growth industry,2 analysis of the
issue of what rules and standards the revision efforts ideally ought to
produce, is often inconclusive or highly debatable. 3 To claim,
therefore, that those rules and standards ought to be efficient or pro-
consumer, and to fault the NCCUSL and ALI should the Code come
up short in that regard, relies upon a mistaken assumption that
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995) (presenting an indepth
study of the ALI and NCCUSL); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9,80 VA. L. REV.
1783 (1994) (examining the lawmaking process of Article 9).
10. Article 3 of the UCC applies to negotiable instruments, see U.C.C. § 3-102(a)
(1990), while Article 4 applies to bank deposits and collections of "items," see id. § 4-
102(a). "'Item' means an instrument or a promise or order to pay money handled by a
bank for collection or payment." Id. § 4-104(a)(9). Transactions governed by Article 4A
are expressly excluded from Article 4, as are credit or debit card slips. Id.
11. See Lawrence J. Bugge, Commercial Law, Federalism, and the Future, 17 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 11, 26-28 (1992) (discussing the scope of revisions); Patchel, supra note 3, at 85
n.4 (detailing revisions on an article-by-article basis).
12. See generally Symposium, Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well?, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 535 (1993) (academic commentaries on Code revision efforts); Symposium, Is the
UCC Dead, or Alive and Well? Practitioners' Perspectives, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 89 (1994)
(practitioners' views on Code revision efforts); Symposium, "Managing the Paper Trail":
Evaluating and Reforming the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1995)
(academic commentaries on Article 9 filing rules and systems); Symposium, Revised U. C.C.
Articles 3 & 4 and New Article 4A, 42 ALA. L. REV. 351 (1991) (academic commentaries
on Articles 3, 4, and 4A); Symposium, The Revision of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1299 (1994) (academic commentaries on
Article 2 revision process); Symposium on the Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994) (academic commentaries on Article 9
revision efforts); see also Patchel, supra note 3 (critiquing revisions to Articles 3 and 4);
Norman Silber, Why the U.C.C. Should Not Subordinate Itself to Federal Authority:
Imperfect Uniformity, Improper Delegation and Revised Section 3-102(c), 55 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 441 (1994) (discussing UCC federalism issues).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 60-70.
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agreement exists among Code practitioners and scholars on the proper
substantive goals of the revisions. In light of the majestic role that
the ALI and NCCUSL have played in the development of United
States commercial law, suggestions that those organizations be taken
out and shot-or at least embark upon a program of extensive
therapy-are disquieting, especially in the absence of a consensus on
the end goals of the Code revision enterprise.
These proposals for an actively political, reformist, and regulatory
UCC also represent a significant departure from the approach taken
by the original drafters of the UCC and contravene many of the
NCCUSL's founding principles.' 4 To a great extent revised Articles
3 and 4 take a view of public policy matters that is not unprecedented
and that often is entirely consistent with the attitude of those who
"invented" our Code." In spite of their intellectual strengths, the
drafters of the originalUCC simply may have erred in failing to obtain
14. See, e.g., Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation
and Consideration of Acts, in HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 431, 3, at 432-33 (1988) [hereinafter
Statement of Policy]. Criteria considered by the NCCUSL to be "negative" in proposing
or considering uniform laws are whether the subjects of the laws are
(1) entirely novel and with regard to which neither legislative nor
administrative experience is available;
(2) controversial because of disparities in social, economic or political
policies or philosophies among the various states; and
(3) of purely local or state concern and without substantial interstate
implications unless conceived and drafted to fill emergent needs or to modernize
antiquated concepts.
Idl
15. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 290-92
(1973) (discussing the drafting process and Llewellyn's sympathy toward the consumer);
David W. Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. Llewellyn Is the Hero of the
Piece; Or Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (19.70) (discussing the effect of the original Code's
failure to take a stance on consumer protection issues); Allison Dunham, A History of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 233, 248 (1965) [hereinafter Dunham, History of NCCUSL] (finding that the
original Code deliberately avoided consumer credit issues); Allison Dunham, Reflections
of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 575 (1982) (stating that one of the "great omissions"
in the original Code was avoidance of consumer protection); Egon Guttman, U.C.C
D.O.A.: Le Roi Est Mort, Vive Le Roi, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 625, 625 (1993) (arguing
that the original Code consciously left consumer protection issues to legislatures and
courts); Homer Kripke, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 577, 582-83 (1982)
(rejecting efforts to include consumer protection issues in original Article 9): Lary
Lawrence, Misconceptions About Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Suggested
Methodology and Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 115, 147 (1983) (suggesting that
original Articles 3 and 4 gave little thought to consumer issues because drafters merely
restated the preconsumer NIL).
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a more consumer- and policy-oriented UCC. Evidence suggests that
even some of the original Code drafters, were they to have had it
their way, might have preferred a different, sometimes even more
activist approach.'6 Moreover, in the years since adoption of the
original UCC, the consumer and law-and-economics movements have
reached maturity; legal theory has advanced; significant shifts in social
attitudes, business culture, and business practices have occurred; and
the interplay of state and federal roles in the regulation of commercial
transactions has been transformed. It might be that such develop-
ments warrant a markedly different attitude toward content and
substance in revising the UCC. Yet, time's inevitable progression by
itself does not necessarily compel a brave, new public Code for our
brave, new public world. That the revised UCC ought to provide a
fountainhead for consumer rights or be a handbook for rational
efficiency is not patently obvious, at least when viewed in the context
of the whole history of the Code.
As perhaps is common to all midlife crises, the Code stands
poised somewhat uneasily between tradition and radical change. This
Article focuses on the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 and advances the
case to be made for tradition-for an anticonsumer and inefficient
UCC. The Article argues that, despite some imperfections, the basic
structure of revised Articles 3 and 4 is sound, and the drafters'
decision not to address aggressively consumer protection or efficiency
issues was and is the proper approach for UCC drafting. Part II
discusses briefly the role of the NCCUSL and ALI in the UCC
revision project. 7 Part III develops and refines models for the
drafting process that have emerged from the debate over the revi-
sions. 8 Part IV rejects the prevailing "public interest" perspective
on the UCC revisions and advances a functional methodology for
16. See, e.g., TWINING, supra note 15, at 125 (discussing Llewellyn's compromise on
consumer issues); Kripke, supra note 15, at 582-83 (acknowledging Soia Mentschikoff's
efforts to include consumer protection issues in Article 9); Karl Llewellyn, Why a
Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1953) ("1 am ashamed of it in some ways;
there are so many pieces that I could make a little better; there are so many beautiful
ideas I tried to get in that would have been good for the law, but I was voted down.");
William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 5 (1967) (explaining that the ultimate Code was
not ideal in Llewellyn's view); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 468-70 (1987) (extensively
discussing the drafting process and compromises that led to the Article 2 merchant rules).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 24-70.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 71-123.
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evaluating those models.'9 Part IV then discusses the interest group
debate in the specific context of the development of Articles 3 and
4'° and argues that, while interest group theory illuminates the
important values that inclusion in the drafting process evokes, a satis-
factory model for UCC drafting must go beyond process values and
address accountability and substance concerns as well.2 Part IV
concludes that a "contextual rules model" for the drafting process
most adequately accommodates the values of inclusion with those of
accountability and substance.' Part V applies this model to revised
Articles 3 and 4 and concludes that the current complaints with Arti-
cles 3 and 4 are greatly exaggerated, if not completely unwarranted."
II. THE PARTICIPANTS AND GOALS
The UCC is the product of a collaborative effort of the NCCUSL
and ALI. Founded in 1892, the NCCUSL is constituted of Commis-
sioners-usually lawyers, judges, law teachers, and legislative drafting
experts. These Commissioners are appointed by the governor or
legislature of each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands, but presumably owe no political allegiance to their
respective jurisdiction.24 The ALI, organized in 1923 and composed
of judges, lawyers, and law professors, has as its purposes "to promote
the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation
to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to
encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work."'  It
19. See infra text accompanying notes 129-43.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 158-79.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 144-93.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 194-214.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 215-86.
24. Detailed discussions of the NCCUSL's organizational structure can be found in
Bugge, supra note 11. at 14-16; Patchel, supra note 3, at 88-93; Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 9, at 601-02. A 1992 article broke down the various legal careers of the 322 NCCUSL
Commissioners as follows:
49%-private practice;
14%-law professors or deans of law schools;
7%-state or federal judges;
25%-state officials or employees;
3%-in-house counsel or private business;
3%-full-time state legislators.
Bugge, supra note 11, at 14.
25. Herbert F. Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.
L.Q. 283, 285-86 (quoting By-Laws, 2 A.L.I. PROC. 429 (1923)).
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chooses its own members.26 Although the ALI and NCCUSL
actively engage in a number of other law reform efforts,27 the two
organizations joined forces as co-sponsors of the original UCC.
While the ALI's stated purposes are broadly articulated and
public-spirited in orientation, the NCCUSL's are far more circum-
scribed. The NCCUSL's constitution provides that its purpose is
merely "to promote uniformity in the law among the several states on
subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable."'  The
NCCUSL's role in the uniform laws process is deeply entrenched in
the federalist tradition. The federal/state dynamic in particular has
had an extremely profound influence on the development of
commercial law. After a nineteenth-century flirtation with a federal
commercial common law,29 the United States Supreme Court in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins30 established that state law would govern
most ordinary commercial transactions.3' The uniform state laws
process paralleled these judicial developments as "a means of re-
moving any excuse for the federal government to absorb powers
thought to belong rightfully to the states."32 Another view relates
the founding of the NCCUSL to perceptions that some subjects were
outside of Congress's Commerce Clause jurisdiction, as then under-
stood.3 The UCC itself played an important role in continuing the
perceived power of the states to regulate in the commercial law area.
The NCCUSL's specific involvement with the Code began after a
26. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 600.
27. The NCCUSL promulgates both model and uniform acts. Statement of Policy,
supra note 14, at 433. Uniform acts seek to alleviate problems caused by lack of
uniformity among the laws of the states that might deter "the free flow of goods, credit,
services, and persons between the states; restrain full economic and social development;
and generate pressures for federal intervention to compel uniformity." Id. at 388.
In contrast to uniform acts, model acts do not affect relationships among the states
but involve problems common to many or all of the states. Id. In addition to its UCC
efforts, the ALI proposes restatements of the law and sponsors other special projects. See
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 600-01 (describing the ALI's participation in other law
reform projects).
28. Constitution and Bylaws, in HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, 391 § 1.2, at 391.
29. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); Boris I. Bittker, The Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, Swift v. Tyson, Uniform State Commercial Laws, and Federal
Common Law: Ships that Passed in the Night?, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 94 (1991).
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. It. at 78.
32. Dunham, History of NCCUSL, supra note 15, at 237.
33. See Bittker, supra note 29, at 95-96 (discussing nineteenth-century perception of
congressional commerce powers).
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movement arose to enact a Federal Sales Act, a movement that ini-
tially had the support of Karl Llewellyn.' Sensing a threat to the
states' established role in regulating commercial law, the NCCUSL
stepped in and proposed the UCC project as a substitute for the
federal act.35
In spite of the federalist origins of the UCC, a century-long
commercial law debate on the continuing vitality of federalism 36 has
recently been reopened. The commercial world that the original UCC
addressed was relatively simple, at least by comparison with today.
In the years since the states enacted the original UCC, the federal
government has enacted a significant amount of federal consumer
protection legislation that affects commercial transactions 7 and has
been directly involved in the areas covered by the UCC.38 Some
commentators, therefore, have argued that these changes now either
mandate substantial, if not entire, federal preemption of the
commercial law area39 or oblige the NCCUSL to relinquish its role
as the key protector of state legislative power.' Presumably the
underlying argument is that, at this particular moment in history, the
need for a national federal commercial law has become critical. As
34. TWINING, supra note 15, at 277-79.
35. See id.
36. See Gilmore, Obsolescence, supra note 2, at 463-66,475-76 (discussing the periodic
emergence of the federalism debate throughout history).
37. See, e.g., Truth in Savings Act § 261, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (1994) (requiring
disclosure of interest rates on deposit accounts); Truth in Lending Act § 101, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1665 (1994) (assuring "meaningful disclosure of credit terms" to consumers); Fair
Credit Reporting Act § 601, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) (regulating when a consumer
reporting agency may furnish a consumer report).
38. See, e.g., Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 § 153, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1640-1641 (1995) (eliminating Article 3 holder in due course status in certain types of
high interest rate home equity loans); Expedited Funds Availability Act § 613, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 4001-4010 (1994) (intruding into Article 4 check collections); Magnuson-Moss warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1994)
(regulating written warranties); FTC Holder-in-Due-Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 433
(1995) (intruding into Article 3 holder in due course doctrine).
39. See, eg., E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Foreword: Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial
Law, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 527, 528 (1980) (arguing that isolated federal legislation creates
"complexity and confusion" and that substantial federal action is merited); E. Hunter
Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence
of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337,338 (1978) (arguing that substantial federal action
is merited).
40. See generally Patchel, supra note 3, at 154-62 (suggesting that the NCCUSL should
consider whether areas ought to be covered by federal as opposed to state law); Rubin,
Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 777-81 (mocking Article 4 participants'
"reverence for state law and distaste for the federal administrative process").
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this Article later discusses,4' strong reasons exist that weigh against
such a choice.
The UCC unquestionably is the NCCUSL's biggest success story,
with the NCCUSL having secured adoption of the original UCC in
nearly every state.42 Additional Articles proposed subsequent to
drafting of the original UCC have also received widespread accep-
tance in state legislatures.43 The UCC revision process begins when
the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC recommends to the ALI
and NCCUSL that revisions are desirable.4 A study group, usually
comprised of a mix of academics and practitioners, is appointed to
research the need for change and to prepare a report on the revision,
which is sent to the ALI and NCCUSL for approval.45 From that
point on, an NCCUSL drafting committee handles the transformation
of the study group report into a final proposed uniform statute.
4 6
The drafting committee is comprised of practicing lawyers, although
academics frequently act as reporters for the committee.47 Both the
ALI and NCCUSL then must approve the revisions prior to submis-
sion to the state legislatures.48 However, the NCCUSL alone is
responsible for seeking enactment of the finished product in the
individual state legislatures.
49
Although the NCCUSL and ALI play the predominant role in
revising the UCC, the American Bar Association (ABA) also has
significant influence on the overall revision process. First, ABA
committees play a key advisory role throughout the drafting pro-
cess."0 More importantly, however, is the recent practice of submit-
ting ALI and NCCUSL approved drafts to the ABA House of Dele-
41. See infra text accompanying notes 180-92.
42. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 9 (manuscript at 52 tbl. Al, on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (listing states' record of passage of NCCUSL acts).
43. See id.; see also Bugge, supra note 11, at 24-28 (discussing the original UCC and
subsequent proposed Articles).
44. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 600.
45. Id. at 600-01; see also Marianne B. Culhane, The UCC Revision Process:
Legislation You Should See in the Making, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 46-58 (1992)
(discussing in detail the steps involved in the approval process). Criteria governing the
selection of the study group include subject-matter expertise, credibility, and mix of
academics and practitioners. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 601.
46. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 601-02.
47. Id. at 602.
48. See id. at 601.
49. See Miller, Study in Process, supra note 3, at 406.
50. See Culhane, supra note 45, at 45-46 (discussing the ABA participation in the
drafting process).
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gates."1 Failure to secure ABA approval of the proposed legislation
may substantially undermine the possibility of widespread enactment
of the law by the individual states.5 2  Finally, the ABA aids the
NCCUSL in attempting to secure enactment at the state level.53
While the interrelationship between the uniform state laws
process and federalism concerns has served to define the institutional
character of the NCCUSL, significant ambiguity still exists regarding
the substance and scope of the legislation produced by the uniform
laws process. Unlike other law-making bodies, the ALI and
NCCUSL, sponsors of the UCC, are unique because they remain
largely politically unaccountable to any constituent body.54 Also
unlike other legislative bodies, the NCCUSL and ALI lack the ability
to enact the laws that they propose.55 That right remains with the
state legislatures. The success of any proposed uniform law therefore
rises or falls with the NCCUSL's ability to convince state legislatures
to enact the legislation.
This interplay between the NCCUSL's unaccountability and its
inability to create binding law is a significant component of attempts
to describe the goals of the uniform laws process. In the public
legislative process, political accountability of legislators is thought to
be a key safeguard that ensures "public-regarding" legislation.56 Yet,
it is the presumed independence of the UCC drafting process that
some deem to be the NCCUSL's most valuable asset.5 The lack of
political pressures ought to result in law that, at least in some sense,
is of superior quality than that wrangled out through the ordinary
political process.5" This qualitative superiority in the legislative
product supports enactment of the proposed law by the states. Some
51. Id.
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id. at 55-58.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 (discussing the appointment of ALI and
NCCUSL members).
55. See James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 2096, 2096 (1991).
56. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62, 75
(1990).
57. See White, supra note 55, at 2096 (suggesting that lack of accountability "produces
a group that is much more sophisticated in the law and more interested in long-range
questions").
58. See id, at 2097 ("[Tjhe principal argument that the Commissioners can make on
behalf of a uniform law when it is considered by a state legislature is its technical and
substantive superiority over a law born in the back room of a state legislature and sired
by a lobbying organization.").
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evidence, though, suggests that interest groups can and do exert signi-
ficant influence on the UCC drafting committees.59 Should interest
group domination of the revision process exist, it would have signi-
ficant ramifications on current views of the proper substance, as well
as the success, of the UCC. To the extent that the Code revisions are
tainted by undue special interests, the key reason for enacting any
revision--qualitative superiority-becomes substantially less powerful.
Apart from the question of independence, the specific details of
the way in which the law produced by the NCCUSL and ALI is
qualitatively better than that produced on a state-by-state basis are
vague. Some commentators have suggested that, with respect to
substance of uniform laws, the NCCUSL ought to seek to produce the
best law, neutral law,61 better law,6u superior law,63 "fair, bal-
anced, and passable" law,64 "wise and workable" law,6' or perhaps
just merely "enactable" law.66  Others have argued that the UCC
revisions ought to serve the "public interest,"'67 be "balanced [and]
public-oriented, ' 68 or advance the "common good."'6 9 Or, finally,
some have suggested that the revisions ought simply be "useful[] to
society."7 The opacity of these attempts to articulate the goals of
the revision efforts is easily discernible. Perhaps in recognition of
this, recent literature has attempted to develop with greater clarity an
59. See generally Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 781-88 (arguing that
interest groups dominated revisions to Articles 3 and 4); see also Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 9, at 607-37 (developing formal models for interest group pressures in uniform laws
process); Scott, supra note 9, at 1784-1851 (discussing politics of Article 9).
60. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 126, 139, 162.
61. h at 146, 162.
62. See generally Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3,579-86 (arguing that the
Code is inferior to federal legislation).
63. White, supra note 55, at 2096.
64. Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1405, 1423-24 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
65. Culhane, supra note 45, at 30.
66. See Miller, Study in Process, supra note 3, at 408; White, supra note 55, at 2097.
67. Donald J. Rapson, Who Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About
the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observations,
28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 255-59 (1994); Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCC Process-
Consensus and Balance, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 287, 290 (1994).
68. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 762.
69. Scott, supra note 9, at 1820.
70. Richard A. Elbrecht, The NCCUSL Should Abandon Its Search for Consensus and
Address More Difficult and Controversial Issues Applying "Process" Concepts, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 147, 152 (1994).
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overall framework for assessing the proper content of the UCC
revisions. The next Part of this Article sets forth these approaches.
III. MODELS OF THE PROCESS AND THE PRODUCT
As revised Articles 3 and 4 make their way through the state
legislatures and as other UCC revision efforts progress, a growing
amount of commentary has begun to address the complex relationship
between the ALI, the NCCUSL, the Code drafting process, and the
proper goals of the revision efforts. 1  The growth in substantive
commercial law doctrine and the myriad of legislative bodies now
engaged in the regulation of commercial transactions set the revision
process in a world arguably far different from that which the original
drafters of the UCC confronted. For example, commercial law has
become increasingly fragmented between the UCC and other state
commercial legislation. At the same time, the federal role in
regulating commercial transactions has attained greater importance.
In the face of such changes, the UCC revision process raises, if only
potentially, legal issues of greater complexity and political and
normative dimension.
Precisely how the revision process should be designed in order to
accommodate these developments is an open issue. Certainly legis-
lative process, institutional, and structural considerations bear
significantly upon the final product of any revision effort." In
addition, the ultimate resolution of this panoply of issues emerges
only after much debate, negotiation, and compromise. Because the
ALI and NCCUSL function as "legislatures," albeit private ones, pos-
itive political theory has been used to evaluate their institutional
structure and that structure's relationship to the legislation that it
produces. 3 In a similar vein, the give-and-take and political dynam-
ics inherent in any legislative process have caused some commentators
to allude to negotiated rulemaking when addressing the proper scope
of the UCC revision process.74
71. See, for example, sources cited supra note 12 (listing commentaries on the
process).
72. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 597 ("[T]he form and substance of a law
are significantly endogenous to the law-creating institution.").
73. See generally id. (analyzing how such lawmaking groups function); Scott, supra
note 9, at 1803-06 (describing the nature and function of the UCC lawmaking process).
74. See Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 744, 786-87; see also Philip
J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (describing
a negotiating process which would result in better rules); Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Beth
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Although useful, these analogies to the public legislative process
in an attempt to model and understand the UCC process can be
somewhat misleading. The process of negotiating administrative rules,
federal agency rulemaking, and the political dynamics of public legis-
latures do not necessarily carry over directly into the uniform laws
arena. Consider negotiated rulemaking. Any negotiation relies upon
rules of the game that will ensure stability of the process and also
produce an acceptable outcome in the particular legal context. 5
Evaluating negotiated rulemaking as a law-making process thus in-
volves consideration of the propriety of negotiation against the
backdrop of views on the political role of federal agencies.
76
Similarly, federal agency rulemaking proceeds within the arena of
administrative law issues such as standing, agency discretion, and
delegation concerns." These are federal constitutional issues that
have little practical direct application to the UCC and the entities that
create it.
Nor are political theories about public legislatures necessarily
germane to all aspects of the UCC revision process. Although the
ALI and NCCUSL are indeed "legislatures" in the sense that they
"pass" a proposed UCC,, they significantly lack the ability even as
lawmakers to enact the UCC as binding law. Enactment, rather, is
the choice of the state legislatures to which the proposal is submitted.
It is only within these narrow confines that the "legislative" function
of the ALI and NCCUSL can be modeled, understood, and evaluated.
Straightforward application of public law theories to the UCC revision
process might, therefore, misdirect the analysis. The analogies to
administrative law and to the legislative process usefully illuminate the
negotiations that occur in the revision process and the lawmaking
Martin, FTC Rulemaking Through Negotiation, 61 N.C. L. REV. 275 (1983) (arguing for
an informal rule-making procedure); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives:
A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE LJ. 1206 (1994) (arguing that
incentive-based systems should be emphasized); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon,
The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG" 133 (1985)
(discussing the Environmental Protection Agency's approach to negotiated rulemaking).
75. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 4 (2d ed., Penguin Books 1991) (1981); see also Harter, supra note
74, at 42-112 (discussing criteria that may lead to successful. negotiations of regulatory
rules).
76. Harter, supra note 74, at 7-8. Even in the regulatory context, negotiation might
not always be the appropriate tool with which to develop a regulation. See id. at 42-52
(suggesting conditions under which negotiation may lead to success).
77, See id at 2-18.
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function of the ALI and NCCUSL. However, political, legislative,
and constitutional concerns arise in those areas that often might be
absent in, or inapplicable to, the UCC revision process.
A political or legislative perspective on the UCC revision process
is certainly not entirely off the point. The revision efforts aspire to
produce law that has the potential to have a binding effect and are
indeed a "law-making" process. Many concerns about public
lawmaking in general thus apply equally to the private process that
produces the UCC. Rather, off-the-shelf application of theory
regarding public legislative processes to model a private process risks
placing the UCC in a procrustean bed in which the public-based
model accommodates public concerns not applicable to the UCC and,
at the same time, fails to accommodate concerns idiosyncratic to
private lawmaking and lawmakers. Any model or evaluation of the
UCC process simply first requires a basic framework for the UCC
law-making effort, one that accurately reflects the private uniform
laws process rather than administrative or public legislative processes.
Recent scholarship addressing various aspects of the revision
efforts suggests three general approaches to this issue. First, the most
vocal critics of revised Articles 3 and 4 have advanced what might be
termed a "policy" model as the foundation for their critiques of those
revisions." Alternatively, it has been suggested that the political
dynamics of the private legislative process might tend to create
politically biased rules, suggesting the possibility that these dynamics
might be exploited to formulate a model for the process.79 Finally,
what will be called a "contextual rules" model would seek to ground
the revisions in the history and development of the UCC as well as
the practices it regulates.' After discussing the approaches in this
Part, Part IV of the Article will evaluate them."
A. Policy/Theory
A predominant theme in critical attacks on the revisions to
Articles 3 and 4 faults those articles for their failure to arrive at a
correct balance among the numerous public policy issues that the
revisions evoked.' Underlying this view is the implicit claim that
78. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 89-96.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 97-123.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 124-214.
82. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 110 (stating that revised Articles 3 and 4 were
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the NCCUSL and ALI ought to structure the revision process in order
to produce legislation that does correctly balance those policy issues.
Accordingly, this might be entitled a "policy model" of the revision
process. A recent critique of revised Articles 3 and 4 succinctly sets
forth one perspective on the policy model:
We have learned to view legal rules, particularly in the
commercial area, as an instrument of social policy rather
than an autonomous body of doctrine reflecting general and
apolitical principles of law. The basic questions to be asked,
therefore, in evaluating legal rules are what purpose they
serve and how well they achieve that purpose. There is no
methodical way to catalogue the entire range of social
policies in a given area, so the best rules must be developed
by judgment and instruction. The two main policies that
appear relevant to a payment system such as checks are
economic efficiency and social equity; two subsidiary ones
are the maintenance of the system and the maintenance of
the institutions that operate the system. 3
In its attempt to attain a proper balance between competing
public policy choices, the policy model first advocates that the
NCCUSL and ALI ensure that the drafting process remains accessible
to all interested parties.84 With respect to Articles 3 and 4, these
interests might generally be categorized as businesses, banks, and
excessively balanced against consumers); it at 162 (faulting uniform laws process for
failing to design legislation which "reach[es] reasonable accommodation among the
interests of all affected groups"); Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at 592-93
(arguing that revisions are inefficient and inequitable).
83. Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at 560.
84. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 156-57 (drafting process needs to be opened up to
include all interested groups); Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 787-88
(criticizing alleged exclusion of consumer groups from revisions to Articles 3 and 4).
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consumers. 5 According to the critics of revised Articles 3 and 4, the
process ought then to have proceeded as follows:
Banks
Businesses - NCCUSL/ALI -- > Policy Based -> Legislatures
Consumers "Legislature" Rules or Courts
Banks
Businesses
Consumers
FIGURE 1
Underlying the policy model in Figure 1 is the premise that the
NCCUSL study groups and drafting committees ought to balance all
interest group concerns and use policy considerations, efficiency and
equity in the context of Articles 3 and 4, as the guides for formulating
revised UCC rules.8 6 To the extent that interest groups are not
successful in obtaining a desired result through the uniform laws
process, those interest groups always could lobby the relevant state
legislature at the enactment stage, either by opposing enactment or by
seeking nonuniform amendments to the uniform law approved by the
NCCUSL and ALL. In addition, interest groups could seek federal
preemption of the area or part of the area, or seek favorable
interpretations of the law using the judicial process.
85. See U.C.C. art. 3 prefatory note (1990) (listing advisors and interest group
representatives). In addition to banks, businesses, and consumers, federal agencies
regulating payment issues, legal academics, and nonbank entities involved in the payment
system of course have a strong interest in the substantive rules that govern the payment
system. See id. (listing federal reserve and association representatives). Any omission is
not intended to imply otherwise, but only to focus upon the most significant interest
groups involved in the Article 3 and 4 drafting process.
The pertinent interest groups would vary depending upon the Article of the UCC
being revised. In the Article 9 revision process, for example, the predominant interest
groups include not only consumer debtors but also specialized asset-based lenders,
commercial banks, unsecured creditors and debtors, business lawyers, and academics. See
Scott, supra note 9, at 1806-07 (discussing interests affected by Article 9 revisions); see also
Rapson, supra note 67, at 267-68 (discussing interest group involvement in Article 5
revision process).
86. Throughout this Article the term "rules" is used to denote both bright-line, concise
rules as well as broad, open-textured rules frequently referred to as standards. See
generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557,559-62 (1992) (discussing distinctions commonly drawn between rules and standards).
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Although the policy approach was advanced specifically to
critique the revisions to Articles 3 and 4, recent views on other Code
revision projects are conceptually similar to the policy approach
explained above by suggesting that legal theory ought to play a
predominant role in the drafting process. For example, Professor
Richard Speidel, reporter to the Article 2 drafting committee, has
suggested that relational contract theory ought to inform and guide
the Article 2 revisions.' Alternatively, law and economic scholars,
not surprisingly, have asserted that the NCCUSL ought to draft laws
"that reduce operational inefficiencies imposed on socially beneficial
private transactions."8' In each case, reference to an overarching
policy or theory is used to support a particular view on the appropri-
ate substance of the Code. Therefore, each might properly be
classified as a policy approach to the revision process.
B. Politics
Another recent response to the debate over the UCC revision
process has been to apply interest group theory to the private uniform
laws process. 9 Falling generally under the rubric of "public choice
theory,"9 this line of attack seeks to assess the effects that interest-
group influences and voting behavior might have on the revision pro-
cess and on the final content of the Code.91 It is important to note
that although the approach seeks to explain interest-group influence
and its relationship to the substantive law produced by the revision
87. See Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 789 (1993) (discussing the characteristics and importance of relational contract
theory).
88. Scott, supra note 9, at 1820 (stating views on the common good).
89. See generally Patchel, supra note 3 (assessing pro-business bias of the uniform law
process in light of interest group theory); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9 (analyzing
interest group effects on the law-making process); Scott, supra note 9 (analyzing the
political economy of the private law-making process responsible for creation of the UCC).
90. A good introduction to public choice can be found in Daniel A. Farber & Philip
P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987). Public choice
literature has two dominant themes. First, it focuses on the structure of voting rules and
the effect that voting structures have on the outcomes of collective decision making. Jerry
L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 123, 126 (1989). Second, it focuses on the explanation or prediction of political
behavior and falls under the general category of "interest group theory." Id.
91. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 607-10 (summarizing conclusions on the
relation between information availability, interest group lobbying, and forms of rules
produced); Scott, supra note 9, at 1816-22 (discussing effects of interest groups on the law-
making process).
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process, it does not prescribe the content of the rules generated by
the drafting effort. The public choice perspective, however, is not
wholly disengaged from normative issues relating to substantive
content of the laws emerging from the process. Public choice aims to
establish that improper influence by interest groups may justify a
court or state legislature in disregarding the privileged status that the
NCCUSL's products normally might have with those entities.92
Although largely explanatory, public choice suggests that political
dynamics in the process exist which raise interesting possibilities for
the substance of the UCC. Under this view interest groups can exert
strong, if not overwhelming, pressure over the revisions. This
pressure, by hypothesis, plays a significant role in the final content of
the rules created by that process.93 Interest group involvement,
which can reflect anything from public-spirited participation to cap-
ture by particular groups of the drafting committees, could be reflect-
ed in the drafting process through inclusion or exclusion in the
drafting enterprise of particular interest groups.94 Some underlying
principles of a political model for the drafting process would differ
from those of the policy model in Figure 1. A political model would
seek to favor one particular interest group or collection of interest
groups over others rather than attempt to accommodate competing
groups in the process. Nor would the process consider policy or
theory to evaluate the content of the rules produced. Rather, the
content would inevitably be biased toward the participating groups.
Although the groups that might be deemed as the selected beneficia-
ries would vary depending on the portion of the Code being revised,
in the Article 3 or 4 context experience suggests that the process
92. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 597-98; Scott, supra note 9, at 1811.
93. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 609-10. Professors Schwartz and Scott
hypothesize, using structure-induced equilibrium theory, that when participants are
symmetrically informed as to the consequences of a proposal, the process will result in
vague rules. Id- at 615-21. In a world of asymmetric information where a single interest
group dominates the revision process, bright-line rules favoring the dominant interest
group will be generated. See id. at 630-33.
94. Some commentators have vaguely suggested that manipulation of the process
through exclusion or inclusion might result in normatively appealing results. Cf. Rapson,
supra note 67, at 266-67 (suggesting closure of process to limit interest group pressures on
drafting committees); Scott, supra note 9, at 1848 ("[O]pening the NCCUSL process to a
wider range of competing interest groups runs the risk of sacrificing the clarity of the
Article 9 rule structure. Ironically, it is the clarity of the rules that makes the statute so
attractive to all affected [parties] in the first place.").
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might seek to favor either consumers or banks and other financial
institutions."
Under a "consumer fights" political model, interest groups
representing consumer interests would receive predominant consider-
ation in the drafting process. Rather than seeking an overall balance
among the varying interests by applying public policy, the goal under
this model would be to ensure adequately consumer interests,
irrespective of the needs, goals, or agendas of other interest groups. 6
The consumer rights model can be diagrammed as follows:
Consumers-> NCCUSL/ALI -> Consumer Biased-> Legislatures
"Legislature" Rules or CourtsT
All
Interest
Groups
FIGURE 2.1
Banks and other business interests would then seek to have their
interests incorporated into the law by either opposing enactment on
a state-by-state basis, seeking nonuniform amendments, seeking
federal intervention in the area, or using the judicial process to obtain
favorable interpretations of relevant statutory provisions.
Quite obviously, if the desire is to accommodate business
interests rather than consumer interests, a different group, such as
financial institutions, could be substituted as follows:
Banks - NCCUSL/ALI -- Bank Biased -- Legislatures
"Legislature" Rules or Courts
All
Interest
Groups
FIGURE 2.2
95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. In contrast, a policy approach to the drafting process would seek to balance the
interests using policy considerations rather than to favor one particular interest over the
other.
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Under this "bank rights" political model, for example, banks
would be favored by the ALI and NCCUSL in an effort to produce
a uniform law that inevitably would protect bank interests. Consumer
groups would be left to secure their interests by directly lobbying the
state legislatures against enactment, by seeking nonuniform amend-
ments, by seeking federal preemption of the area, or by seeking
judicial interpretations of the statute that favor consumer interests.
C Context
A final general approach to the revision process disengages the
revision process from the political pressures or policy analysis that the
preceding models seek to emphasize. This approach refers to the
UCC itself and to the practices it regulates in order to determine the
appropriate scope and substance of the revisions. Because this
approach seeks to ground the revision process in the overall context
in which the law is to apply, it appropriately might be called a
"contextual rules" model.
Professor Robert Hillman's comprehensive analysis of "no oral
modification" clauses in the context of revising Article 29' illustrates
in detail one application of the contextual rules approach. Hillman
first suggests that any benefits resulting from a revision of a particular
UCC rule might be exceeded by its costs.98 Such costs include those
incurred through drafting miscalculations or inferior compromises that
diminish the effectiveness of the Code section being revised and that
conflict with the overall vision of the Code Article.99 In addition,
there are costs incurred in seeking fifty-state reenactment, reeducation
costs, and litigation costs." ° Hillman then goes on to suggest
numerous general principles that ought to guide and constrain the
NCCUSL's assessment of whether, and to what extent, a particular
UCC section should be revised.' Under this approach, reconsider-
ation is warranted when (1) the provision has been the subject of
frequent litigation that reveals inconsistent, vague, or ambiguous
language;"° (2) a major and relatively complete change in technolo-
97. Robert A. Hillman, Standards for Revising Article 2 of the U.C.C.: The NOM
Clause Model, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1509 (1994).
98. Id. at 1509.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1509-10.
101. See id. at 1513-22.
102. Iad at 1514-16. While litigation is one indication that revision may be necessary,
it is not a sufficient one.- Certain UCC sections setting forth open-textured standards such
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gy has rendered the section. obsolete;"° (3) substantial empirical
evidence demonstrates that the section impedes acceptable commer-
cial practices;" (4) the section is inconsistent with other law;"5 or
(5) the section has been subject to several nonuniform amend-
ments.'" All of these criteria focus on the context in which the rule
under consideration for revision has operated in order to determine
the scope of the revision. -
Other recent analyses of possible UCC revisions also reflect, if
only implicitly, this contextual approach to the process. For example,
James J. White's proposal for repeal of UCC section 9-301(1)(b),'"
which subordinates an unperfected security interest to the rights of
lien creditors, relies predominantly upon context as the, reason
supporting repeal of that section." After assessing the consequenc-
es of repeal in terms of fairness and efficiency,"°9 White exhaustively
addresses the case law and concludes that repeal would reduce
wasteful litigation." '  Similarly, Raymond Nimmer's overall ap-
proach to codification and to the Article 2 revisions is grounded in an
as the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, see U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-103 (1990), and the
Article 2 doctrine of unconscionability, see id. § 2-302, have intentionally been left open-
ended and invite litigation on a case-by-case basis. In these instances litigation alone does
not suggest a need for revision. Hillman, supra note 97, at 1514-15. However, analysis of
litigation under such standards may reveal that judicial resources are being wasted in a
vexatious and meaningless fashion, which may justify at least a preliminary reconsideration
of the scope of the standard. See generally A. Brooke Overby, Bondage, Domination, and
the Art of the Deak An Assessment of Judicial Strategies in Lender Liability Good Faith
Litigation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1993) (reviewing lender liability good faith litigation
and arguing that the obligation of good faith has resulted in excessive litigation).
103. Hillman, supra note 97, at 1516-17.
104. Id. at 1517-18.
105. Id. at 1518.
106. Id. at 1518-19. In addition, Professor Hillman suggests another general principle
that deals more with drafting style and format than with substantive content: The Code
rules and standards should be set forth in the text of the UCC rather than in its
commentary. Id. at 1519.
107. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1990).
108. James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 823 (1993).
109. Id. at 826-30.
110. See id. at 830-41. White takes a similar empirical and contextual approach to the
UCC in his evaluation of the impact of Article 2. See James J. White, Evaluating Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Preliminary Empirical Expedition, 75 MICH. L.
REv. 1262 (1977). A thorough analysis of Article 2 litigation leads White to point to
particular provisions that ought to raise concerns for drafters. Id. at 1281-82 (judicial
confusion arising between U.C.C. § 2-201 and § 2-207); see also James J. White, Reforming
Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing Rules, 79 MINN. L. REV. 529
(1995) (adopting contextual approach in evaluating Article 9 filing rules). -'
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overall contextual framework."' Nimmer's approach clearly rejects
a wholly theoretical or policy-based view on the revisions in favor of
an approach that involves a detailed examination of commercial
practice, commercial law, and contract policy.'
In addition to its visibility in many analyses of revisions in
progress, context as the guiding principle for UCC drafting also has
support in the history of the Code. The contextual model bears an
obvious similarity to Karl Llewellyn's idea of "situation-sense" in
judging."' What Llewellyn meant by the term is a subject of much
debate."' Views on situation-sense range from the concept being
an analytic and systematic method for classifying facts to being a
natural law theory under which immanent law is uncovered by the
decisionmaker." 5  One can reject the latter view of situation-
sense-uncovering of immanent law-without denying the power of
the former view as a useful framework for guiding a codification
process. It is clear that context was important to the original drafters
of the UCC. While difficult to articulate precisely, contextual rules
in the sense used by the original drafters imply three distinctive
attributes. First, contextual rules are reflective on the past."6
Accordingly they cannot be deduced solely from abstract concepts
such as efficiency, fairness, autonomy, or equality, at least in the
absence of some justification or support from the past.' Second,
111. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and
Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (1994).
112. ld. at 1365. Nimmer asserts that the source for substantive commercial law default
rules
lies not in a theoretical model, but in a reference to commercial and trade
practices. This is not simple faith in empirical over normative sources for
commercial law. Rather, it stems from the reality that, even though we may not
know how law interacts with contract practice, decisions about contract law in
a codification or in common law will continue to be made. Unless countervailing
policy concerns clearly appear, we should make those decisions by reference to
sources that reflect an accumulation of practical choices made in actual
transactions.
Id. at 1360.
113. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 121-
57 (1960).
114. TWINING, supra note 15, at 216-27 (discussing competing interpretations of
situation-sense).
115. Id.
116. Karl N. Llewellyn, Two Documents on the Uniform Commercial Code: Keynote
Memorandum, in TWINING, supra note 15, app. E at 527 [hereinafter Llewellyn, Keynote
Memorandum] (noting that drafters should recanvass work and experience).
117. See Hillman, supra note 97, at 1519 (rejecting the idea that normative criteria such
as efficiency or fairness play any role in the revision effort); Nimmer, supra note 111, at
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contextual rules seek to codify existing business practices n8 and
thereby ensure reliability and predictability in commercial transac-
tions." 9 Finally, contextual rules are forward-looking because they
encourage development, rather than stagnation, of the law."
A contextual rules approach to the Articles 3 and 4 revisions
might be diagrammed as follows:
Banks
Businesses -- NCCUSL/ALI -> Contextual - Legislatures
Consumers "Legislature" Rules or Courts
T
Banks
Businesses
Consumers
FIGURE 3
The contextual rules model in Figure 3 differs in some significant
respects from the policy and political models discussed previously. As
with the policy model, Figure 1, all interested parties are included in
the drafting process. Yet, unlike the policy model, the contextual
rules model does not seek to balance the rights of consumers and
banks using independently derived policy considerations. Unlike the
consumer fights model, Figure 2.1, or the bank rights model, Figure
2.2, the contextual rules model accommodates all interested parties in
the drafting process. Those interest groups, of course, always have
the ability to lobby the state legislature for or against enactment, for
nonuniform amendments, or for additional legislation that seeks to
protect rights not recognized under the contextual rules model. In
1362-63 (rejecting the "hypothetical bargain" in contract theory as artificial and unpredict-
able).
118. Soia Mentschikoff, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 540-41 (1982)
(focusing on business practice and policy); Schnader, supra note 16, at 4 (stating Llewellyn
believed the UCC should reflect actual practice, rather than other legislation or decisions).
119. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt
to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEo. W. 1141, 1147
(1984) (noting that Llewellyn wanted reliability and predictability).
120. Llewellyn, Keynote Memorandum, supra note 116, at 526 (stating that a statute
ought to encourage development of law).
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addition, those groups may seek federal preemption of the area or
attempt to advance their interests through the litigation process.
Tensions quite obviously exist among the general principles of the
contextual approach. For example, continuing to regulate a business
practice that no longer exists12 1 would be reflective of the past but
certainly would not be reflective of actual practice or forward-looking.
Moreover, determining what the context demands in assessing a
revision can evoke considerable ambiguity. As with rules derived
under the policy model, the rules derived under the contextual rules
model also "must be developed by judgment and instruction."1 A
key distinction between the two models is that the judgment and
instruction involved in such an assessment under the contextual rules
model stem from a different source. Under the policy model, the
UCC rules result from the drafters' discernment and weighing of
competing public policies, theories, or political views. Under the
contextual rules model, the rules are grounded in an assessment of the
past, examination of existing practices, and a look to the future and
the development and growth of the law. While some policy consider-
ations certainly might weigh into that analysis," those consider-
ations do not predominate the, decisional process in the manner
dictated by the policy model.
121. An example of such a practice is the "process of posting," defined by the original
UCC as "the usual procedure followed by a payor bank in determining to pay an item and
in recording payment." U.C.C. § 4-109 (1989). Completion of the process of posting could
constitute final payment under original UCC § 4-213, resulting in the payor bank being
held accountable for the item. A conflict arose in the courts over whether final payment
under the original Article 4 could occur before the payor bank's midnight deadline because
the bank had completed the process of posting prior to that time. Compare West Side
Bank v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 155 N.W.2d 587 (Wis. 1968) (finding that process of
posting is not complete until midnight deadline and time to reverse entries has passed)
with H. Schultz & Sons, Inc. v. Bank of Suffolk County, 439 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(rejecting West Side.Bank and finding that final payment through completion of process
of posting can occur before deadline).
However, few modem financial institutions "post" a check in the manner contemplat-
ed by the process of posting test, and instead rely upon highly automated check collection
procedures. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW
499 (4th ed. 1995). In recognition of this change in practice, the revised version of Article
4 has abandoned the process of posting test. See U.C.C. § 4-215 cmt. 5 (1990).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88 (describing the policy model) (quoting
Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at 560).
123. This Article rejects Professor Hillman's view that public policy and legal theory
have nothing to do with the revision process. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
Yet, while policy considerations are a factor even under the contextual rules model, policy
carries only nominal weight in the overall decision process.
[Vol. 29:645
MODELING UCC DRAFTING
IV. ASSESSING THE OPTIONS
The discussion of the general approaches in the previous section
is not, and is not intended to be, exclusive of all other conceivable
approaches to revising the UCC."4 However, the fundailentally
different principles that animate each of the approaches provide an
overall structure for evaluating the manner in which UCC revision
efforts have progressed in the past and for guiding the revisions
currently in progress. Each model leads the NCCUSL down
divergent paths: toward implementation of external views on proper
public policy, toward wholehearted involvement in the political arena,
or toward tailoring the law to accommodate commercial contexts.
Given that they differ on such fundamental points, an important
initial observation is that casual reliance upon any one particular
approach to evaluate the revisions ought to be mistrusted. Indeed,
the multiplicity of views indicates that substantial disagreement exists
over the proper way in which the NCCUSL and ALI ought to
proceed. Reluctance of the NCCUSL to proceed in one direction
cannot ipso facto represent a failure in process, or evidence of
industry domination. That direction may not have been the proper
route to take in the first place. Objections to the Articles 3 and 4
revisions, therefore, are decidedly unpersuasive without a convincing
argument in support of the model upon which the objections are
based.
There has been little discussion on this underlying issue of the
best approach. This Part begins with an analysis of the criteria that
ought to be used to evaluate the competing models."z The section
first rejects the prevailing "public interest" approach for evaluating
the revisionsY The section then argues that largely neutral and
noncontroversial criteria of political accountability, inclusion, and
uniformity ought to beused to evaluate the alternative models set
forth in Part III of this Article. 27 The remainder of the Part applies
the criteria to those models and concludesthat the "contextual rules"
124. For other approaches, see generally Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and
2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1533 (1994) ("practice" view
of contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing); Elbrecht, supra note 70 ("process"
view on revisions).
125. See discussion infra part IV.A.1-5.
126. See discussion infra part IV.A.1.
127. See discussion infra part IV.A.2-5.
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model, Figure 3, most satisfactorily advances the goals of the UCC
revision effort.'s
A. Evaluative Criteria
1. Transcending the public interest
Even if the UCC drafting process is viewed as a negotiation, and
even if the NCCUSL and ALI are viewed as legislatures, the criteria
used to evaluate that process obviously must advance an acceptable
result, given the surrounding circumstances.'29 As discussed earlier,
there are a myriad of views on the substantive goals of the UCC.3 °
Yet, the vagueness of these views, not to mention the tensions among
them, render them unsatisfactory principles to guide the revision
process or to evaluate the substantive law generated by the process.
A common theme that can be drawn from the existing views is
that the UCC revision process ought to be an endeavor dedicated to
advancing the public interest and ought to generate in some way a
"better" law than otherwise would be obtained through ordinary
state-by-state legislative enactment. Consider, though, suggestions
that the drafting process ought to produce the "best" law. The best
law may not necessarily be "neutral" law, an alternative view of the
goals of the drafting process. The best law, or even merely better
law, may not be "enactable" law. On the other hand, enactable law
may not be good public policy. The strength of any claim as to the
superiority of any piece of legislation significantly depends upon the
criteria relied upon to support that claim. The best law therefore may
be, inter alia, that which advances efficiency or individual autonomy,
is fair, or protects the powerful or powerless. Assertions that any one
law or rule is better than another similarly demand some standard
with which to make the comparison, evoking the same concerns as the
notion of the best law.. Even if the participants in the UCC drafting
process could arrive at an agreement on the evaluative criteria to be
used to guide the process, the law might not be widely enactable at
the state legislature level, particularly if disagreement exists outside
of the drafting committees about the agreed upon method of
evaluation.
128. See discussion infra part IV.B.
129. See supra text accompanying note 75.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 60-70.
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The current views on the'substantive goals of the UCC revisions
are therefore confusing and vague, if not at times exquisitely
contradictory. They are sharply contingent upon the validity of, or
consensus on, external methodologies and political or legal theories
which themselves are subject to debate and controversy. Concomi-
tantly, the failure of the ALI and NCCUSL to accommodate actively
any preferred notion of the public interest into the final legislative
product-the UCC-would be seen as an enormous failure of the
drafting process. Simply put, public interest theory, in whatever
manner it is articulated, cannot provide a meaningful perspective on
the substantive goals of the UCC revision project. 31
The mistaken reliance upon the public interest to guide the
revisions has brought about two extreme perspectives on the drafting
process. On the one hand, public choice has sought to reveal the self-
interests that often parade under the guise of the public interest.
Some analysts have suggested that the participants in the revision
process are largely unconstrained in their decision to favor or to
oppose a particular revision proposal.13 For example, participants
131. For a discussion of the failure of rhetorical attempts to define and understand what
the public interest requires, and an attempt to model the conditions under which special
or general interests may be reflected in regulation, see Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L.
Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interes4 and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis,
6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 167, 172-85 (1990). The following passage describes
forcefully the problem of understanding the public interest:
When we ask whether regulation is undertaken in the public interest, what are
we asking? Are we asking whether regulation and regulators do what is "best"
for the public? By what test of "best"? Are we asking whether regulation is
efficient? Are we asking who benefits from regulation? Are we asking whether
regulation is largely about wealth creation and transfer, or whether other values
are at stake? Is a "public interest" theory a normative theory about the
desirability of reflecting the preferences of a general polity over special interests?
Is it a normative theory about the desirability of promoting other-regarding goals
over self-regarding ones? Is it a positive theory about the degree to which
regulators will promote general interests over special interests? Or is it a
positive theory about the opportunities available to regulators to pursue personal
but other-regarding views rather than policies that favor either general or special
interest in increasing personal utility?
Id. at 172. A recent debate over precisely what the public interest demands with regard
to the UCC revisions evidences the equivocation as it applies to the UCC. Compare
Rapson, supra note 67, at 257-59 (arguing that the public interest includes good faith,
efficiency, and fairness) with Ring, supra note 67, at 302-05 (disagreeing with Rapson's
views).
132. For example, Professors Schwartz and Scott assume in modeling the uniform laws
process that there is weak enactment constraint on the participants; that the decision "to
accept or reject a proposal is not importantly influenced by the likelihood that the
proposal will be widely enacted." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 609. To support this
assumption, they point to the low enactment rate of NCCUSL products overall. See id
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seeking law reform-usually law professors-will seek to advance
those interests through participation on study groups and drafting commit-
tees.'33 Industry groups and lobbyists participate to the extent that,
given costs, they can persuade the committees to enact rules in their
favor." The individual members of the ALI and NCCUSL who
vote to approve the work of the study groups and drafting committees
base those votes on the individual member's own ideal views on the
consequences of a particular law-reform proposal.135 These ideals,
of course, seek to maximize the members' own utility.13 The result
that emerges from this cacophony of utility maximization is a Code
revision process that is driven toward retention of the status quo and
that is highly subject to capture by special interests."' Public choice
thus exposes the relentless pursuit of self-interest in the drafting
process and undermines claims that the Code is somehow "superior"
to legislation created through the more traditional public legislative
process.
At one extreme the public interest and its public choice antithesis
create a Code revision effort resounding with despair and largely
unconstrained by any consensus on collective goals that transcend
individual self-interest. At the other extreme the public interest is
used to evaluate cynically the substantive provisions that emerge from
that process. For example, if one holds the view that the public
interest demands law that draws upon economic analysis in order to
allocate losses that inevitably result in maintaining a payment
at 609 & n.34. While this assumption certainly may be a legitimate one to draw with
respect to some more esoteric NCCUSL products other than the UCC, assuming weak
enactment constraint on the revisions to the UCC is a highly controversial move. The
UCC is beyond question the NCCUSL's most successful product. See supra text
accompanying notes 42-43. That considerations of enactment would not bear strongly
upon an assessment of revisions to that product implies that, even in spite of any original
success of the product, participants are oblivious to maintaining that success. This
assumption when applied to the UCC revisions seems as curious as Coca-Cola's ill-fated
decision to change the formula of its successful Coke soft drink. If this key modeling
assumption is off-base when applied to the UCC, the Schwartz and Scott conclusions as
they apply to the revisions should be appropriately discounted.
133. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 610-11, 618.
134. lId at 610-11.
135. See, e.g., id. at 611-13 (describing the "ideal" points of private legislature
members).
136. See id. at 612; see also &L at 615-19 (modeling member preferences in a world of
symmetric information); id. at 621-24 (modeling member preferences in a world of
asymmetric information). -
137. See id. at 650-51.
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system,131 the failure of the Code's revisions to accommodate those
views would be met with opprobrium.39 Moreover, given that the
public interest was not served by the revisions, that fact provides
evidence of industry domination of the process and supports rejection
of the Code by the individual states.
The ill-conceived, and in fact impossible, attempt to create an
understanding of the public interest that is both meaningful and
relatively noncontroversial thus results in a political perspective on the
Code that is inherently fraught with conflict. Perhaps it is inevitable
that the selection of any criteria to guide and evaluate the UCC
drafting process is a controversial and uncertain move. Yet, this
conclusion would bring with it some troubling implications. Taken to
its extreme, the view means that there can be no consensus at all
about the UCC. Even a modest consensus on the substantive goals
that the UCC law-making effort ought to advance is unlikely. At the
same time, the NCCUSL's role in, and approach to, every UCC
drafting effort is open to scrutiny and criticism, depending upon the
criteria used to critique the product of the process. This inevitably
leads to the view that the Code drafting process and the Code itself
is radically contingent upon legislator self-interest-unprincipled and
corrupt. This disturbing conclusion leads one to consider entirely
jettisoning the uniform laws process as a method of lawmaking.
138. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation
for Consumer Payments, 66 TEx. L. REV. 63 (1987) (advancing an economic framework
for resolving loss allocation issues).
139. See Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 768-70. Professor Rubin
reflects on his unsuccessful attempt to raise economic analysis in ABA committee
discussions on the revisions to Article 4 as follows:
[L]aw and economics analysis was greeted by most of the committee members
with complete incomprehension. Some of this may have been the result of the
bank attorneys' identification with their clients .... But law and economics is
not generally regarded as a liberal, pro-consumer approach. Had the attorneys
been prepared to think in economic terms, they easily could have contested my
statements .... But the blank stares that I received from [some] members of
the committee indicated a much more profound rejection of the ideas I was
proposing.
Id. at 768. Rubin attributes much of the ABA subcommittee's reluctance to accept his
views to the members' narrow, elitist world-view, their unfamiliarity with developments in
legal theory, and their corruption. See, e.g., id. at 749 (stating that the "conceptual frame-
work" of members "was the product of being white, male and upper-middle class"), 752-54
(noting that members psychologically identify with clients), 755-57 (attributing rejection
of his views to the members' identification with clients), 768 (pointing out members' lack
of familiarity with theories of Ackerman, Selznick, Nonet, and Posner).
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As a matter of critical discussion perhaps the above account of
the drafting process could be an acceptable perspective on the
revision process. However, the public choice critique offers little in
the way of positive guidance for participants in the process. Presum-
ably those participants do not wish to fling themselves lemminglike
over the cliff into the sea of commercial law history. Yet, that is the
end to which the public choice critique points, if taken seriously by
the participants. The radical uncertainty that the public interest
perspective, taken with its public choice antithesis, gives rise to must
then be alleviated in order to develop a positive methodology for
structuring and evaluating the revision process. This can be done first
by acknowledging that, as a matter of the actual practice of revising
the UCC, participants are constrained in their choices." Next, the
criteria for evaluating the preceding models ought to reflect and
advance the role that the NCCUSL plays in the overall law-making
enterprise. The best model should simply advance the role that the
NCCUSL, as a private legislature, is well-suited to play.14' By
acting in accordance with that best model, the NCCUSL maximizes
its effectiveness as a lawmaker, given its institutional role.
This functional and institutional approach to structuring the UCC
revision process can be illustrated by conceiving of the NCCUSL as
a supplier in the law-making market. 42 One of its principal prod-
ucts is uniform state laws. 43 As a supplier, the NCCUSL has a
strong interest in inducing customers-state legislatures-to consider
the product. Competition in the form of private contract, individual
state action or inaction, federal intervention, or agency rulemaking of
course exists. At the same time, citizens in general have an interest
in ensuring that any law-making process is conducted in a manner that
comports with their fundamental concepts of proper legislative action,
given that enactment of the product may act to constrain their liberty.
The best product that the NCCUSL can offer is the one that the
140. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
141. Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 102-03 (1980) (adopting a functional approach to judicial review); NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (advancing a comparative institutional framework for
analyzing legal decisions).
142. Cf. Roberta Romano, Law As a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle,
I J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 225 (1985) (reviewing incorporation statutes in terms of
state competition).
143. See supra note 27.
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NCCUSL is functionally proficient at producing and is competitive in
the market for law, but created by a process that comports with views
on fundamental base-line constraints on any law-making process.
An institutional methodology for evaluating the drafting process
can yield relatively neutral evaluatory principles that are much less
controversial than vague assertions that the UCC ought somehow to
be the "best enactable public-spirited law." Because such principles
would reflect and seek to advance the role that the NCCUSL and
ALI play as legislatures in the commercial law-making market, they
would be much less indeterminate than the public interest perspective.
Further, because the principles would reflect generally accepted views
of the NCCUSL's and ALI's institutional function, they would obtain
greater legitimacy as criteria with which to assess the UCC drafting
process. A legislative process conducted in a manner that advances
the relatively noncontroversial law-making function and goals of the
lawmaking entity within the overall governmental structure ought to
be entitled to a great amount of deference. In this way, the institu-
tional perspective avoids the extreme uncertainty that the public inter-
est/public choice perspective necessarily generates, and therefore
provides a more acceptable basis for evaluating the models of the
drafting process.
2. Structure: political accountability
The first largely uncontroversial principle that reflects the
institutional function of the NCCUSL and ALI is that of political
accountability. Unlike other legislatures, the participants in the UCC
process are not accountable through election to any constituency.
Rather, NCCUSL members are appointed by the states, whose
politically accountable legislators retain the ultimate decision to enact
the final legislative product."4 ALI members and other participants
are essentially accountable to no particular persons or institutions.'45
This political unaccountability of ALI and NCCUSL members clearly
has benefits. Independence allows those organizations to work
outside of the political pressures that bear upon the public legislative
process and presumably facilitates open inquiry, debate, evaluation,
and experimentation throughout the drafting process. But, the
independence of the ALI and NCCUSL has a darker side. When
substantially unaccountable organizations offer laws to the states that
144. See supra text accompanying note 24.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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constrain the behavior of the state's polity, and when the stamp of the
ALI and NCCUSL on such proposed laws carries significant weight
with state legislatures, a cautionary exercise of such independence is
warranted.
The structural and political issue , revolves around states'
delegation of legislative power to private organizations. The uniform
laws enterprise is one of the oldest examples of "privatization.
146
In the public sector such delegations to private entities raise not only
due process but also legitimacy and representative government
issues.47 While in the context of uniform state laws, the federal
constitutional issues-and most likely any state constitutional
issues" -are absent, similar accountability and legitimacy problems
nonetheless remain. Private delegation raises concerns, applicable to
any delegation, that the law-making process might proceed outside
checks that constrain the public legislature and also that the public
legislature may wish to use delegation to avoid responsibility for
policy decisions that properly ought to be made by elected offi-
cials.149  These concerns are equally germane to the uniform laws
process.
If there were indications that states in fact relied upon the
uniform laws enterprise to avoid responsibilities to their constituen-
cies, a strong legitimacy argument could be raised against the entire
process. However, evidence points to the contrary. The relationship
between the states and the NCCUSL can be seen as a relationship in
which the states have delegated a certain portion of legislative power
to the NCCUSL. It is difficult to view this grant of power as a
wholesale, vague delegation of legislative authority to act in the
general public interest and promote the general welfare. In addition,
there is scant evidence that might suggest that state legislative powers
are delegated to the NCCUSL in order to avoid the political
146. The term "privatization" refers in general either to the sale by governments of
government-owned businesses to the private sector or to the delegation of governmental
powers or functions to private entities. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law,
and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 449,450-52 (1987). The use of the term in the text refers
to the latter kind of privatization.
147. See id. at 497-502 (discussing delegation problems); Krent, supra note 56, at 69-80
(discussing constitutional limitations on congressional private delegations); David M.
Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 658-72 (1986)
(discussing constitutional principles invoked by private delegations).
148. Lawrence, supra note 147, at 647, 664-68.
149. See Krent, supra note 56, at 75-77 (discussing concerns that underlie private
delegations of public power).
[Vol. 29:645
MODELING UCC DRAFTING
consequences of individual state action. The states retain a "veto"
right that can be, and often is, exercised by refusing to adopt a
proposed uniform law or by enacting nonuniform amendments to the
proposal. Beyond these rather weak monitoring devices,1" the
NCCUSL and ALI are largely unconstrained by any formal checks on
their legislative activities. Yet, states' refusal to enact some NCCUSL
products strongly suggests that the delegation is less than complete,
although the precise scope of the delegated authority indeed is often
ineluctable.
Accordingly, only self-regulation and market forces act to check
the NCCUSL from going beyond the limits of delegated powers.
Proposed uniform legislation that goes beyond the scope of the
delegated power can have two consequences. First, the state
legislature can either consciously accept or reject the proposed
uniform law or enact nonuniform amendments to correct provisions
deemed beyond the NCCUSL's power. In these cases market forces
adequately check the NCCUSL's exercise of, retained state legislative
authority. However, exercise of these market checks may have the
effect of creating nonuniformity.5 On the other hand, the uniform
law might be enacted by the state legislature, an instance of market
failure, in which case state citizens are bound by a law that not only
exceeded the authority given to the NCCUSL but also was created
outside of the checks provided in the public arena. In this objection-
able case the NCCUSL's usurpation of retained state law-making
power creates a severe problem of legitimacy. Transgressing the
bounds of delegated authority can thus- lead either to nonuniformity
or to serious questions concerning the political legitimacy of the
private laws process.
An extension of this perspective on political accountability would
advance a claim for abolishing private legislatures such as the ALI
and NCCUSL entirely. Any topic now otherwise before the
NCCUSL would be wrangled out in each state legislature, or at the
federal level, with interest groups using the political process to
advance their positions through traditional legislative efforts.52
150. Recent empirical analysis has begun to analyze the extent to which states
effectively sort through NCCUSL proposals. See generally Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra
note 9 (analyzing whether the NCCUSL's proposals lead to efficient uniformity and
whether the proposals result in enactment of inefficient laws).
151. For a discussion of uniformity as a principle for guiding the UCC revisions, see
infra part IV.A.4.
152. See Dunham, History of NCCUSL, supra note 15, at 233 (discussing uniformity
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However, use of private drafting committees has benefits that cannot
be obtained through traditional state legislative action. A single
drafting entity can dramatically reduce the costs that would arise if
each state were individually to attempt to cobble together its own bit
of payment, sales, or other commercial law. The ALI and NCCUSL
also have the expertise to create a uniform commercial law that has
a relatively long period of effectiveness, thus advancing the goal of
federalism 53 and allowing incremental development of the substan-
tive areas covered by the UCC."M Finally, the ALI and NCCUSL
process provides an effective forum for gathering information on
divergent approaches to issues that have arisen in commercial law
areas. This forum promotes a meaningful debate on the advantages
and disadvantages of such approaches. In this way the uniform laws
process reduces the costs of enacting state law. Yet, the values that
ensue from independence must be weighed with the NCCUSL's and
ALI's lack of accountability to the citizens of each state.
To shield itself from attacks based on accountability, the
NCCUSL therefore ought to seek to draw an appropriate line
between delegated law-making power and those powers retained by
the states. A myriad of factors can weigh into and guide that
assessment. The NCCUSL criteria for determining when a subject is
or is not a potential area for uniform legislation'55 are sound initial
limitations that reflect concerns over accountability. By avoiding
novel, untested, or controversial areas, the NCCUSL restrains itself
from venturing into subjects more appropriately the concern of
politically accountable public legislatures. Past experience with other
uniform laws also can instruct the attempt to delimit the scope of
legislative power. For example, two of the NCCUSL's least successful
commercial law products have been the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code (U3C)5 6 and the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act
(UCSPA). 57 This provides a signal from the states that such issues
through voluntary action, agreement, and delegation).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 180-92.
154. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1990) (promoting incremental development of
substantive areas through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties).
155. See supra note 14.
156. See Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision of U. C.C. Article 2,35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1565, 1566-67 (1994). Merely 11 states have adopted the U3C in some
version. Id. at'1567.
157. Id. The UCSPA has been enacted, with substantial changes, by only four states.
Ia.
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are considered to some extent to be properly within the province of
the states. Finally, areas in which significant nonuniform amendments
have arisen may indicate that the area is, one in which states wish to
retain control. Analysis of these factors, as well as testing the waters
for the states' views on particular issues, can aid in developing a
coherent sense of the intended scope of the drafters' delegated
authority.
3. Process: inclusion
Some evidence suggests that in the UCC drafting process the ALI
and NCCUSL have not been immune from interest group pressures.
Reforms to the process, therefore, have focused on the ways in which
the revision efforts can accommodate more fully the often conflicting
interests of those involved in the process and neutralize the power
that special interests may seek to exert in the process. However, as
will be suggested in this section, the interest group perspective on the
UCC-and the derivative principle of inclusion of those groups-plays
an important but limited role in the overall Code drafting effort.
The much told tale of the history of Article 4158 exemplifies
special interest involvement in and, according to some, domination of
the Code drafting process. The story traces back at least to Frederick
Beutel's often histrionic and now immortal attack on the UCC" 9
While the Code in its entirety was the focus of Beutel's objec-
tions," much of his venom was reserved for the original version of
Article 4. The pro-bank, anticonsumer one-sidedness of Article 4,
according to Beutel, resulted in "a vicious piece of class legislation"
and a "deliberate sell-out" by the ALI and NCCUSL to the bank
158. For extremely comprehensive, but biased, accounts of the Article 4 story, see
generally Patchel, supra note 3; Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3.
159. See Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Commercial Code Should Not
Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952) [hereinafter Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Code];
see also Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61
YALE L.J. 364 (1952) (responding to some of Beutel's criticisms of the UCC).
160. Beutel considered the language of the UCC to be "strange" and "unduly
complicated" and felt that the UCC offered little improvement over existing law while
causing "confusion." Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Code, supra note 159, at 335-36.
At the same time Beutel felt that the Code acted to favor bankers and lawyers, at the
expense of the business community. Id. Recently it has been argued that many of
Beutel's objections ought to be discarded because his predictions were not borne out by
the Code as enacted. See Carl Felsenfeld, But the Proposed Uniform[?] Commercial Code
Was Adopted, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 597 (1993).
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lobby.16' Beutel's account of the bank lobby's involvement in the
Uniform Bank Collections Code that preceded Article 4, of the
tentative decision to omit Article 4 from the UCC, and of the
subsequent cramdown of what became former Article 4 through the
ALI, NCCUSL, and ABA, formed the basis for Beutel's conclusions
that Article 4 ought to be rejected wholesale. 62
Notably, the drafting of the original Article 4 also resulted in the
first summary execution by the bank lobby, in an almost Aeschylean
venting of "fury,"" of the principal architect of their displeasure.
Their hapless victim was Fairfax Leary, a University of Pennsylvania
law professor appointed by Karl Llewellyn to head the Article 4
drafting effort. Leary produced a draft of Article 4 that sought to
reconceptualize significantly the field of bank collections.164 Such
suggested radical change evoked the intense dissatisfaction of the
banks and resulted in Leary's removal as well as the initial elimination
of Article 4 from the UCC. The banks then cobbled together their
own bank collections code, allegedly forced it vi et armis by the ALI,
NCCUSL, and ABA, and thus, the original Article 4 was born.
Beutel's objections encompassed both process and substance.
Not only was the process detestable in its concerted effort to exclude
any group other than the powerful from the debate, but substantively
Article 4 contained rules that were, in Beutel's view, dramatically pro-
bank, anticonsumer, and unfair."6 Subsequent events indicate that
we have yet to escape from the ordeal accounted by Beutel, at least
according to some participants in those developments. The failure of
the 3-4-8 Committee/New Payments Code (NPC) effort in the 1970s
and 1980s'6 has been traced to the inability of participants to
161. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Code, supra note 159, at 357-63; see also
Frederick K. Beutel. The Negotiable Instruments Act Should Not Be Amended, 80 U. PA.
L. REv. 368, 378-79 (1932) (suggesting that Code drafting has class legislation aspect). A
brief account of the Article 4 drafting process by one of its principals can be found in
Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Michael A. Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good News from
Articles Three and Four, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 611 (1982).
162. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Code, supra note 159, at 357-63.
163. See Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at 555; Rubin, Thinking Like a
Lawyer, supra note 3, at 746.
164. Leary & Schmitt, supra note 161, at 614-15; Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra
note 3, at 555.
165. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Code, supra note 159, at 359-63.
166. For detailed accounts of the 3-4-8 Committee/NPC effort, see generally Fred H.
Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39 BUS. LAW. 1215 (1984) [hereinafter
Miller, Report on NPC]; Miller, Study in Process, supra note 3; Rubin, Efficiency and
Equity, supra note 3.
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withstand adequately interest group pressures as well as to recognize
the need for significant change in the substance of payment law. The
3-4-8 Committee and the NPC were efforts spearheaded by the
NCCUSL to accommodate within the rubric of uniform state laws the
technological changes and innovations bearing upon payment law that
had emerged since enactment of the original versions of Articles 3
and 4. As with the original Article 4, the reporter for the project,
Harvard Professor Hal Scott, attempted to make a case for significant
substantive change. 67 Scott proposed to synthesize conceptually as
well as terminologically into a "new payments code" the rules for the
myriad of payment forms that had emerged since original Articles 3
and 4.6' Some evidence suggests that the NPC drafting enterprise
failed to be opened sufficiently as to allow affected parties to
comment on a proposal that would have altered significantly their
rights under existing law.169  The draft also contained consumer
protection provisions, although these were ultimately removed in an
attempt to secure support for the effort.17
Scott's NPC met much the same end as Leary's Article 4.
Interest groups were capable of destroying an arguably superior
proposal-although with respect to the NPC even consumer groups
joined in-presumably because all stood to lose something through
change.' Again, then, interest groups effectively halted the
development of payment law; this time the victim was a proposal that
sought to harmonize the largely divergent treatment of payment
systems, while giving due regard to consumer interests. The reporter
was "excoriated" by these groups in a meeting so apparently
horrifying that it can only obliquely be alluded to, in the words of one
167. The reporter's views on payment law can be found in Hal S. Scott, The Risk
Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1978). Professor Scott, who disavows that there is any "real
jurisprudence" of commercial law, id. at 737, believes that statutory rules are designed to
alter rather than to codify existing practice, id. at 739.
168. See Miller, Study in Process, supra note 3, at 407-09; Rubin, Efficiency and Equity,
supra note 3, at 557-58. For accounts of some substantive issues addressed by the NPC,
see Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Patricia B. Fry, A "Systems" Approach to Payment Modes:
Moving Toward a New Payments Code, 16 UCC L.J. 283 (1984); Fairfax Leary, Jr. & J.
Stephen Pitcairn, The Uniform New Payments Code: The Essential Identity of "Pay"
Orders and "Draw" Orders, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (1984); Miller, Report on NPC,
supra note 166.
169. See Miller, Study in Process, supra note 3, at 408.
170. See Leary & Fry, supra note 168, at 286 n.8; Miller, Study in Process, supra note
3, at 408-09; Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at 557-58.
171. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 108; Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at
557-58.
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commentator, as "grisly."'' In a retreat from the unpleasantness of
the NPC experience, the NCCUSL embarked upon a modest and
limited rewrite of Article 3 and amendments to Article 4.173 Those
revisions were approved by the ALI and NCCUSL in 1990, and are
now making their way through the state legislatures. 4 Yet, some
persons closely involved with that modest revision project have
commented at length on a perceived usurpation by the bank lobby of
the drafting process, leading to the resignation of an academic
heading an ABA subcommittee participating in the revisions."
An important point with regard to the above account of Article
4 is that the account draws from narratives concerning the process.
Yet, the use of "stories" to shape our values and opinions and to
advance a particular political position is widely known.'76 Whether
these narratives are intended to reflect what "really" happened or
have some other motive is an open question. The history of Article
4, nevertheless, unquestionably demonstrates the significant role that
interest groups can play in the development, or lack thereof, of the
UCC. Indeed, usurpation of the UCC drafting process by special
interests and the exclusion of other interested parties is undesirable
as a general political matter. Inclusion of persons whose lives are
affected by proposed legal rules into the debate on those rules is an
important principle not to be taken lightly by the ALI and NCCUSL.
Suggestions for reform to the process that seek to advance this
principle of inclusion therefore ought to be considered seriously by
the NCCUSL.'"
172. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 746.
173. See Miller, Study in Process, supra note 3, at 410-16 (discussing scope of, and
drafters' approach to, Articles 3 and 4 in light of NPC experience).
174. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
175. See generally Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3 (describing the bank
industry's involvement in the drafting process and criticizing choices made in the revisions);
Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3 (arguing that revisions fail to implement proper
social policy and ought not to be enacted). Professor Rubin's scathing charges concerning
the ABA subcommittee are rebutted in Rapson, supra note 67, at 250-55.
176. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 129-57 (D. Lee trans., 2d rev. ed. 1974) (discussing the
use of stories in the state).
177. See, e.g., Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., The UCC Thrives in the Law of Commercial
Payment, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 113, 129 (1994) (arguing that participation of consumers
in the drafting process ought to be funded); Patchel, supra note 3, at 156-57 (suggesting
the NCCUSL open up the drafting process, even by affirmative action, to accommodate
barriers to collective action); Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the
U.C.C. Article 2 Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593, 1593 (1994) (arguing
that consumers need to be included in drafting).
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Seeking inclusion in the Code revision process undeniably
advances important participatory values crucial to any normatively
appealing law-making process. Yet, the bare directive of "inclusion"
is distinct from the substantive goals of that process. It is important
to note that the other persistently recurring theme of the period
spanning from original Article 4 to revised Article 4 relates to
substance rather than process. In each attempt to revise Article 4,
proposals for fundamental conceptual change to payment law were
made and rejected. Even assuming that a rogue band of bank
lawyers178 has held hostage the proper development of payment law
for the last century, that fact alone, however disturbing, would be
insufficient to conclude that inclusion will resolve all the issues that
arise in every UCC drafting effort. Such a position erroneously relies
upon a "hot tub" theory179 of UCC drafting by naively assuming
that once all groups are brought into the process, somehow a
substantively satisfactory and enactable UCC will emerge from the
debate.
Thus, while inclusion advances the give-and-take in any negotia-
tion or legislative process and brings with it the values of participa-
tion, nonetheless in any negotiation some substantive criteria are
necessary to further circumscribe the rules for that negotiation.
Beyond inclusion, other principles and values related toward
substance rather than participation are required to assess fully the
UCC drafting process. The following section will discuss that
substantive issue.
4. Substance: uniformity
Transcending the concept of public interest as a guide for
evaluating the substance of the rules generated by the UCC drafting
The NCCUSL's "Planning and Coordinating Enactments" (PACE) plan requirement
attempts to address inclusion values. The PACE plan, which is implemented by the
drafting committee, identifies outside interests possibly affected by the proposed revisions
and solicits their input. Fred H. Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the
Private Law Area, 79 MINN. L. REv. 861, 868 (1995) [hereinafter Miller, The Future].
178. Current trends provide that those parties advancing the interests of financial
institutions be designated "bank lawyers" or "bank attorneys." Those advancing consumer
interests go by the more enlightened and statesman-like title of "consumer representa-
tives." See generally Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3 (using terminology
throughout).
179. See Harter, supra note 74, at 31 ("[I1f only we strip off the armor of an adversarial
hearing, everyone will jump into negotiations with beguiling honesty and openness to reach
the optimum solution to the problem at hand.")..
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process leaves one principle, uniformity, as the key substantive goal
of the UCC revisions. The principle of uniformity as used in
commercial law invokes two interrelated concerns. It first addresses
the strong federalism concerns that have served to define the role of
the NCCUSL in the legislative process. To the extent that largely
uniform enactment among the states is obtained, the historic power
of the states. to regulate commercial transactions'o is preserved.
"Uniformity" has another dimension in the UCC that initially appears
unrelated to federalism concerns. Uniformity of the substantive law
that applies to any class of particular commercial transactions has long
been recognized as a general commercial, business need; this issue is
frequently referred to as "mercantile uniformity." The UCC itself
recognizes mercantile uniformity among its principal purposes. 8'
The values of federalism and of mercantile certainty that underlie
the need for uniformity work in tandem. Substantive uniformity of
rules between states is necessary to facilitate commercial transactions,
If such uniformity is largely obtained at the state level,1" the
potential for federal incursion into the area is lessened and the power
of the states retained. Conversely, if a substantial lack of uniformity
exists among the states which impedes commercial transactions, the
potential for federal involvement is heightened, and a concomitant
decrease in the power of the states will ensue. If a uniform commer-
cial act fails to obtain widespread enactment or to accommodate the
mercantile interest in certainty, the potential for federal intervention
in the name of mercantile uniformity may occur, at the expense of
federalism concerns. Uniformity thus seeks to advance the commer-
cial community's interest in mercantile uniformity, with the
overarching purpose of protecting federalism concerns. Uniformity
is not necessary to protect mercantile interests alone, but rather to
protect mercantile interests through state legislation.
The claim that the NCCUSL and ALl ought to develop
commercial law that has the potential to be uniformly enacted by the
states is increasingly coming under fire. Some have suggested, for
example, that perhaps the time finally has come for a "National
180. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
181. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1990).
182. Complete interstate uniformity of the UCC probably never will be realized in this
world. See Silber, supra note 12, at 456-59 (discussing the Code's "imperfect uniformity").
Nor is complete uniformity necessarily an end that the NCCUSL aggressively ought to
pursue. See id at 456-57 (discussing advantages inherent in "rough" uniformity).
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Commercial Code."'" The changed relationship between the state
and federal governments and the emergence of a more national,
integrated economy also have led to claims that the sponsors of the
UCC ought to consider whether proposed legislation is better dealt
with by the states or by the federal government." Finally, a few
commentators have argued the NCCUSL and ALI should abandon
their attempt to craft rules that have potential for uniform enact-
ment. 5 These arguments against uniformity are decidedly unper-
suasive.
First, the claim that the NCCUSL no longer ought to use the
uniform laws process to preserve states' power to regulate in the
commercial law area implicitly carries with it a rejection of federalism
altogether. Just because commercial law in recent years increasingly
has become a matter of national as well as local concern ought not
spell the death of the federalism concern in commercial law.
Although some might view the federalist system as "America's
neurosis,"'8 6 substantial, intelligent, and meaningful disagreement
exists over the proper relationship between the federal and state
governments. The Supreme Court's recent opinion that struck down
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond Congress's
Commerce Clause authority"8 indicates that the debate is far from
being resolved. It would therefore be a highly controversial move for'
the NCCUSL, at this time, to abandon the federalist tradition
altogether.
Second, legislating at the state level frequently has benefits over
legislating at the federal level."s  Federal lawmaking has the
183. See Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 4, at 557-61. Under this solution, the NCCUSL
and ALI would be excluded from the process. Professors Cohen and Zaretsky conclude,
however, that a federal process might not be preferable to the existing uniform laws
process. Id. at 561.
184. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 160-62.
185. Id. at 159-60 (arguing that drafters "need to change their attitude about the
importance of the enactment of proposed uniform laws as the measure of their success");
Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 783-87 (criticizing sharply the NCCUSL
for seeking uniformity).
186. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908 (1994).
187. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
188. For general discussions in the commercial law field addressing the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of state and federal legislative processes, see Bugge, supra
note 11, at 23-24; Miller, The Future, supra note 177, at 869-71; Fred H. Miller, Is Karl's
Kode Kaput?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 703, 705-06 (1993) [hereinafter Miller, Karl's Kodel;
Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at 587-92.
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obvious efficiencies that ensue from having one legislative body
addressing the issue at hand, perhaps better representation of
interests, and the advantage in creating true uniformity at a national
level. Nonetheless, there are also benefits to be obtained by seeking
uniformity through state-by-state uniform law enactment. Uniformity
achieved through federal legislation may provide a uniform solution
acceptable only to a majority of states, with minority interests or local,
regional interests being forced to accept whatever regulation the
majority prefers. Some evidence also suggests that federal law is
more difficult to amend than state law, making federal law less
sensitive to changes in technologies, processes, or mercantile practices
that might affect transactions in the commercial area being regulat-
ed." It is not until those changes become so widespread on a
national basis that the impetus for amendment obtains sufficient force
to merit federal deployment of scarce resources to accommodate
changed practices. In contrast, state-by-state enactment has the
benefit of allowing states to experiment with the Code and with other
state legislation to address local mercantile practices or contract issues
that might not be widespread nationally. This allows fo*r individually-
tailored law that still accomplishes the underlying federalism goals of
the UCC. Moreover, Congress arguably is less able politically to act
responsibly and quickly, and is highly subject to pressure from special
interests, perhaps even more so than the NCCUSL and ALI. 9t
Finally, and most importantly, institutional considerations support
the NCCUSL maintaining its role in our federalist system as a
protector of state control over commercial law. In some individual
cases or in some areas of the UCC, perhaps the above reasons for
seeking to achieve uniformity at the state level fail.' Perhaps other
189. Robert G. Ballen, The Federalization of Articles 3 and 4, 19 UCC L.J. 34, 45
(1986). But see Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 4, at 558-59 (discussing comparative
advantages of modifications and amendments at the federal level).
190. Miller, Karl's Kode, supra note 188, at 706.
191. For example, practices regarding maintenance of the check collection system
perhaps now are so similar throughout the country that there is little need for state-by-
state legislation to address regional variations. The Federal Reserve Board has been given
broad authority to regulate the check collection system. See 12 U.S.C. § 4008(c)(1)(A)
(1994) (granting power to the Federal Reserve System to regulate "any aspect of the
payment system, including the receipt, payment, collection, or clearing of checks").
Furthermore, the Board already plays a significant role in regulating that system. See 12
C.F.R. § 210 (1995) (Regulation J); 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1995) (Regulation CC). Thus,
additional regulation at the federal level would incur few additional costs and involve little
action on the part of a slow Congress. However, indications are that federal regulators
have little interest in expanding their involvement in areas covered by Articles 3 and 4.
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lawmaking processes can generate more normatively appealing or
efficient legislation. Even assuming, though, that the time in fact has
finally arrived in which a federal commercial law is inevitable, or even
assuming that federal law may often have benefits over state law, the
NCCUSL is simply the wrong legislature through which to accomplish
that goal. The resolution of the federalism debate ought to be a
decision for the state and federal legislatures and for the judiciary,
rather than a bargaining chip on the UCC drafting table. Certainly
a private organization composed of unelected scholars and legal
practitioners ought not to catalyze the death of state legislative power
over commercial transactions on little more than fuzzy perceptions
that federalism is dead. Any decision to take from the states that
which, until now, has been their prerogative ought to emerge from the
federal government, rather than the NCCUSL. Any decision by the
state legislatures to retain or relinquish rights thought to be within
their historic province ought to come from the states. And finally, it
must be noted that the NCCUSL is, after all, an organization which
by its constitution is dedicated to the development of uniform state
laws and to the preservation of state legislative power through their
enactment.192
5. Conclusion
As argued above, the current public interest approach to the
UCC revision process is fundamentally flawed. Reliance upon any
particular conception of the public interest to evaluate the product of
the ongoing UCC project is methodologically unsound given the
absence of a consensus on the public interest. Perceptions of what
type of legislation is in the public interest are too widely disparate in
our pluralist society to guide meaningfully the Code process. At the
same time, public choice as a response to the public interest approach
eviscerates the UCC revision process of anything beyond narrow
maximization of the individual utilities of the participants in the
process.
An institutional perspective on the drafting process can transcend
the public interest/public choice dialectic. Under this perspective, a
satisfactory model for the UCC revision process should comport with
largely noncontroversial principles that have a basis in the institutional
role of the NCCUSL and ALI as legislatures and as lawmakers. This
See Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 780.
192. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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section has argued that political accountability, inclusion, and
uniformity are such principles. Political accountability reflects the
status of the ALI and NCCUSL as unelected law makers. Inclusion
advances participatory process values. Finally, uniformity seeks to
protect the rights of the states to legislate in the commercial law area.
The next section will evaluate the approaches to UCC drafting
discussed earlier in this Article 93 using these three criteria.
B. The Case for Context
Accountability, inclusion, and uniformity warrant easy rejection
of the politically biased models.94 Those models-the consumer
rights model, Figure 2.1, and the bank rights model, Figure
2.2--clearly are problematic. First, both seek to exclude particular
groups from the drafting process, either through closing of the process
or otherwise. Even if no physical exclusion occurs in fact, the
underlying presumption of bias that drives the content in those
models mutes any meaningful participation of groups invited to the
process but whose contributions are dismissed because they contra-
vene the need for bias. Accordingly, the principle of inclusion is
seriously undermined by the biased models.
Of even greater concern is the substantive political bias of the
rules generated through the consumer rights and bank rights models
and, concomitantly, the accountability principle. Under each model,
the politically unaccountable ALI and NCCUSL place their imprima-
tur upon a statute which is, and which from the start was intended to
be, a politically biased protection of class rights. Indeed, many facets
of the bank rights model have formed the basis for criticizing the
process which begat Article 495 On the other hand, suggestions
that the NCCUSL and ALI take a more aggressive approach to UCC
issues involving consumer rights'96 are equally as suspect to the
extent that those suggestions are interpreted to mandate political bias
toward the consumer. The consumer rights model is subject to the
same charges as those levied against the bank rights model because
193. See supra text accompanying notes 82-123.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 89-96.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 158-75.
196. E.g., Rosmarin, supra note 177, at 1602-04 (suggesting that the NCCUSL "should
use its leadership... [to take] an affirmative, aggressive approach to adding appropriate
consumer provisions"). I
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it seeks merely to protect a different class and, therefore, ought to be
as objectionable as the bank rights model.
The politically biased models also threaten to undermine the
principle of uniformity. The excluded party is left to lobby the
particular state legislature in order to forestall enactment of the
product generated under the biased models, an inevitability that
comes at the expense of widespread speedy enactment. States
ideologically leaning toward the excluded group most likely will reject
enactment entirely.97 Even if enactment is inevitable, the extreme
political bias at the drafting stage nonetheless leads to substantial
delays in the process of enactment, as state legislatures sort out the
bias in particular provisions and consider nonuniform amendments
that seek to balance otherwise slanted provisions in a uniform act. In
this way, the biased models pose a great threat to substantial
interstate uniformity, and thereby heighten the potential for federal
intervention in the area.
Perhaps in response to the deficiencies of the biased models, the
emerging paradigm for the UCC drafting process is the policy model,
Figure 1."' Under this view, through inclusion of all interested
parties in the drafting process and the weighing of the often compet-
ing policy implications of particular UCC provisions, the end result
ought to be a proposed uniform law that adequately balances, on
policy grounds, the interests of all concerned. 99 While the values
that the principle of inclusion brings to the drafting process cannot be
overemphasized, and while some evidence suggests the absence of
consumer representation in the process of revising Articles 3 and
4,200 nonetheless the other aspect of the policy model, policy bal-
ance, is more open to question and scrutiny.
The policy model suggests that the drafters should carefully weigh
the competing public policies and theories that are evoked by
provisions under consideration, make a considered choice, and render
their determination as to how the balance was obtained. Several
197. As has occurred in a small number of states that have considered enacting revised
Articles 3 and 4. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
198. See generally Patchel, supra note 3 (relying upon policy model to critique
anticonsumer aspects of Article 4); Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3 (relying
upon policy model to argue that Articles 3 and 4 reflect a failure of the legislative process);
Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 743 (relying upon policy model to argue
that Articles 3 and 4 reflect interest group influence).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 158-77.
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arguments have been advanced in support of the argument for policy-
derived rules. First, its supporters claim that the policy model is the
appropriate model for the UCC drafting process because we have
"learned" that legal rules in the commercial area are instruments of
social policy and not a reflection of general, apolitical principles of
law.201 Next, they state that the idea that "commercial law, or any
law, is non-political, '  is outdated and archaic, if not entirely
absurd.23  Finally, because our "dominant legal paradigm" has
evolved through the years since the formation of the NCCUSL and
the enactment of the original UCC and because we now apply
"modern jurisprudential concepts, ' '2°4 the policy model is necessarily
the preferred, if not inevitable and required, process for UCC
drafting.
Two common themes run through this defense. First, it assumes
that modernity and fashion by and in themselves bear great, if not
conclusive, weight in determining the substance of the UCC. Second,
it claims that the transformation of commercial law from a nonpoliti-
cal to a political nature renders the policy model a modern fact of life.
These claims are unconvincing. Many interesting things about
commercial law may have been "learned" from the pages of law
journals and books in the days since the Realists, but even if indeed
anything about commercial law can be truly learned, that fact alone
hardly compels a conclusion that the policy model is therefore
inevitable. The validity of that learning, and more particularly its
practical application to the UCC drafting process, is always a matter
of scrutiny, debate, modification, and perhaps rejection. No UCC
drafting process necessarily must reflect whatever social, political, or
academic theory is in fashion, or perhaps learned, at the particular
historical moment of a revision.
As advocates of the policy model assert, it may in fact be
verifiable that commercial law is not, when viewed as a mass of legal
doctrine, entirely apolitical in nature. But, it does not logically follow
from that assertion that, therefore, all commercial law must be drafted
to be political in nature. While some areas of commercial law may
be, and surely ought to be, political in nature, it is not inconceivable
201. Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at 560; see also supra text accompany-
ing note 83 (discussing premises underlying the policy model).
202. Patchel, supra note 3, at 87.
203. Id.
204. Id at 163-64.
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that other areas may be very largely nonpolitical in nature. 5
Moreover, reliance upon Karl Llewellyn's statement concerning the
nonpolitical nature of commercial law' to contrast the jurispru-
dence of today with the outdated world view of the original drafters
ignores the intended meaning of that claim, which is an open
question.2" Some evidence suggests that Llewellyn used the term
idiosyncratically, and intended it to mean "noncontroversial."2'
Finally, even if a political dimension can be isolated within every
single commercial law rule or standard, the conclusion-that the
NCCUSL and ALI ought therefore implement the UCC drafting
process to exploit and advance that political dimension to the
exclusion of other values that might exist within the rule or standard
and without due regard to their institutional function in the commer-
cial lawmaking process-is debatable.
An analysis of the policy model under the principles of uniformi-
ty and accountability supports its rejection. Assume, for example,
that the policy model compels on a consumer-related issue a
determination of Rule X in favor of the consumer. Assume also that
the state legislature, if considering the issue alone, would have arrived
at the balance differently, or Rule Y in favor of businesses.2
Presented with the proposed uniform Rule X, the legislature must
then consider whether to enact Rule X or its preferred Rule Y.210
A twofold argument supports adoption of the official text over the
legislature's own preference: first, that Rule X is the result of a
superior decision making process-that is, the legislature is wrong;
205. Indeed, this appeared to be Llewellyn's view on the substance and scope of the
Code: "There is a very considerable body of commercial law which is very largely non-
political in character, and which can be put into shape to be flexibly permanent."
Llewellyn, Keynote Memorandum, supra note 116, at 524 (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 87 ("Indeed, much has changed since Llewellyn made
the statement [and] few legal scholars today would suggest that commercial law, or any
law, is nonpolitical.").
208. See Wiseman, supra note 16, at 494, 539-40 (concluding, after extensive analysis
of Llewellyn's views on the Code, that "nonpolitical" was idiosyncratic and intended to
mean "noncontroversial").
209. This could occur if (1) the state legislature disagreed on the proper balance struck
by the NCCUSL through its own deliberative process or (2) if interest groups in the
jurisdiction exerted sufficient control over the legislature to sway it to change the balance
struck in the drafting process.
210. While it is conceivable that a state might blindly enact the uniform law, depending
upon the controversial nature of the right, interest groups have a great incentive to lobby
their legislatures to alter Rule X.
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second, that adoption of the state's preferred Rule Y would lead to
interstate nonuniformity and the concomitant federalism concerns.
Presumably the ALI and NCCUSL would seek to conduct an
independent inquiry that might lead to a better determination in some
social policy sense. Yet, it is questionable whether the incentive to
adopt a better rule will outweighthe state legislatures' strong need to
accommodate the interests of their polity. Policy or theory might
dictate enactment of Rule X, but the states' accountability to its
citizens dictates enactment of Rule Y. Certainly the state has, in the
interest of federalism and mercantile uniformity, some incentive to
adopt the UCC rule. However, whether allegiance to the uniform
laws process will outweigh state legislatures' responsibilities to their
citizens is an open matter, particularly when the issue involves
significant political issues such as consumer protection statutes.
Certainly, it seems conceivable that many state legislators might deem
accountability to their citizens more significant than any esoteric
values that ensue from uniformity, and therefore enact Rule Y.
Enactment of Rule Y is a much easier course for the state legislatures
than explaining to state citizens the often ineluctable and tenuous
relationship between state and federal governments. Accordingly,
under the policy model we should expect to see a greater amount of
nonuniform enactment, and therefore an eroding uniformity of the
UCC.
The policy model in this manner hinders enactment of the UCC
and encourages nonuniformity, and, at least by hypothesis, might
result in increased costs of enactment on a state-by-state basis. It
presumes that state legislatures will value uniform enactment over
their obligations to their constituents or to private political interests.
Yet, interest group pressures on the state legislatures as well as
legitimate, deeply felt concerns of accountability to state citizens make
this less likely to be the case. That uniformity will prevail when the
UCC drafting process makes significant policy determinations on
controversial political rights is unlikely, particularly given the
divergent interests of the states. This is because the decisions were
made in the absence of consideration of the legislators' accountability
to the state citizens.
The contextual rules model,2 ' Figure 3, minimizes these
problems. The contextual rules model advances inclusion to the same
211. See supra text accompanying notes 97-123.
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degree as the policy model, but avoids many accountability and
uniformity concerns. Contextual rules are grounded in existing
commercial practice and in the development of state commercial law.
A contextual approach takes an initial stance on the revisions that
attempts to remain politically and theoretically neutral, although rules
derived from the process are not neutral. It also attempts to codify
existing commercial practice rather than leaping bravely into
uncharted territory on untested notions of public policy or legal
theory.212 Context thus provides the state legislatures with verifiable
reasons for the revision. Given that these reasons are supported by
empirical evidnce and actual practice, they constitute a more
persuasive argument for enactment than mere reference to abstract
and controversial views on public policy. This primary focus upon
context as the reason that supports the legislature enacting the UCC
revision lessens not only the political involvement of the ALI and
NCCUSL and the accountability problems that ensue therefrom, but
also the potential for nonuniform enactment.
Even if context ought to be the essential focus in the drafting
process, some policy choices inevitably do enter into that process.
213
Context may point to two, or even more, possible approaches to an
issue. Should such choices become inevitable at that time, certainly
a policy analysis is appropriate. In the face of such a choice, the
drafters ought to inquire closely into context and weigh the factors
that lead it to propose the particular rule in the manner in which it
does. The drafters also should provide due guidance to the state
legislatures and courts, in the official comments to the text, as to why
the balance was struck in the manner it was and the competing factors
that weighed into the analysis.
One argument for uniformity may be raised against the contextu-
al rules model. The model clearly will result in legislation that is
modest in scope. Controversial political, public policy issues are
outside the scope of the revisions absent evidence from practice or
concrete legal developments that warrant addressing those issues in
the revisions. This creates a need for state legislation to accommo-
date concerns not properly the subject of the Code under the
model-for example by enacting consumer protective legislation either
through nonuniform amendments or, more preferably, through
additional statutes that supplement the UCC. However, leaving this
212. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
213. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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right to the state legislatures rather than usurping their legislative
function leads only to a narrow area of nonuniformity rather than a
radical nonuniformity that threatens the entire existence of the Code.
Allowing individual states to protect rights not identified or resolved
in the drafting process in addition gives the states the opportunity to
tailor law to particular needs of their citizenry and to experiment with
new protections and limitations that will expand, rather than constrict,
the development of commercial law.
Two other objections, which are related in concept, also might be
raised against the contextual rules model. On the one hand, some
might claim that the use of context to determine the proper scope of
the revisions is a cleverly disguised argument for retaining the "status
quo," a position that frequently has regressive, antireformist over-
tones. In contemplating a revision, however, the option of retaining
an existing rule or principle that has been shown to be functioning
well, even if it is the status quo, is not necessarily myopic. Change for
the sake of change is not a goal that zealously ought to be pursued to
the exclusion of other considerations. Substantial social and economic
costs inevitably ensue when changes in the rules governing commer-
cial transactions occur. 14 Moreover, few assurances exist that any
proposed change will, once fully implemented, operate as effectively
as its advocates assert. There is always the possibility that change
ultimately may prove to have been ill-advised. Nor does the
contextual rules model mandate that the NCCUSL adhere cautiously
to the status quo. Rather, the model seeks to accommodate the need
for change within an overall framework of context for determining the
scope of that change. Changes merely must be supported by
reference to the rule's commercial context. In many areas, a wide
diversity of views on the application and scope of particular UCC
sections has emerged through case law, doctrinal research, empirical
studies, nonuniform amendments, and changes in commercial practice.
The model merely demands that those sources be consulted when
arriving at a revised approach to the issue.
At the other side, others might claim that the model gives the
UCC little room to break the chains of commercial context and be
free of all the biases, inequities, immoralities, and inefficiencies that
any legal practice carries with it. Therefore, the revisions promise
little dramatic or sweeping reform. Whether the Code can so easily
214. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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be liberated into commercial law truth is debatable. Law, in practice,
always seems deficient when viewed in the shadow of our ideals. In
addition, policy-based rules and policy analysis suffer from as many
shortcomings, biases, and ambiguities as context-based rules. Finally,
the contextual rules model does not reject substantial reforms and
significant legal changes. Absent support from the UCC as practiced
and in context, the model rather simply leaves those decisions to the
state and federal legislatures, the places where perhaps those decisions
ought properly be made.
In sum, the debate over the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 has sent
the ALI and NCCUSL a seductive invitation to move toward the
policy model of UCC drafting. While application of public policy and
theory may at times be necessary, strong arguments exist to support
rejecting the model as a general approach for the UCC revisions.
Freely applied, the policy model threatens the independent judgment
of the states on important policy issues and impedes widespread
enactment of a largely uniform UCC. Given that nonuniformity
increases the potential for federal preemption, the policy model in
fact is, in disguise, an invitation to the NCCUSL and ALI to destroy
the UCC-their most successful product. In contrast, although
reflecting a less grand and comprehensive idea of the UCC revision
efforts, the contextual rules model acts to ensure the proper political
role of the ALI and NCCUSL as unaccountable legislatures, as well
as the continued vitality and growth of the UCC.
V. Is IT HALF So BAD WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 4 AS THEY
SAY?
215
As stated earlier in this Article, it was the 1990 revisions to
Articles 3 and 4 that provoked renewed interest in examining the
processes that produced the UCC.2 16 More specifically, it has been
claimed that the Articles 3 and 4 drafting enterprise was a "dis-
grace" 7 and that the NCCUSL and ALI lent their names to a
215. In the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson:
People grieve and bemoan themselves, but it is not half so bad with them as they
say. There are moods in which we court suffering, in the hope that here at least
we shall find reality, sharp peaks and edges of truth. But it turns out to be
scene-painting and counterfeit.
RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Experience, in ESSAYS BY RALPH WALDO EMERSON 292, at
295 (Harper & Row 1951) (1926).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 2-9.
217. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 788.
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"bankers' enterprise" while giving "the banking industry the ability to
clothe itself with public policy and to overwhelm most state legisla-
tures with a false aura of public-oriented impartiality." '218 These
indeed are serious charges, and to prove them critics of the Article 3
and 4 revision process point to the substantively biased nature of the
revisions toward banks and businesses and against consumers.219
A full and comprehensive analysis of the scope of all the changes
to Articles 3 and 4 is beyond the scope of this Article. This section
will focus specifically on the provisions that critics claim most strongly
support their charges of industry capture of the revisions-the UCC
provisions concerning allocation of theft and fraud losses in the
Articles 3 and 4 payment system " and concerning the
bank/depositor relationship.221  While those provisions are not
entirely without flaws, it will be argued that application of the
contextual rules model severely undercuts claims that the drafters
erred significantly in failing to adopt a more consumer-oriented, or
more efficient, scheme for addressing those issues. In fact, those
provisions are largely consistent with a proper approach to the UCC
drafting process. Reliance upon these provisions to claim industry
group capture of the drafting process is therefore misplaced.
A. Allocation of Fraud Losses
Perhaps the most significant departure that revised Articles 3 and
4 take from prior law involves the allocation of theft and fraud losses.
A significant risk in running a check-based payment system are
monetary losses incurred when the payor bank' pays a check that
bears a forged or unauthorized drawer's signature, a forged or
unauthorized indorsement, or an alteration. Under both the original
218. ld.
219. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 110 ("[T]he revised Articles 3 and 4 are even more
pro-bank than were their predecessors."), 110-20 (arguing in detail how revisions act
against consumers); Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 786-87 (concluding
that drafters' "ongoing commitment to the common-law model" evidences lobbying efforts,
and questioning whether that approach will result in "proper" rules or policies); Schwartz
& Scott, supra note 9, at 643-45 (claiming that the form of rules produced by Articles 3
and 4 revisions are indicative of single industry domination of the drafting process).
220. See infra text accompanying notes 222-56.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 257-86.
222. "Payor bank" means a bank that is the drawee of a draft. U.C.C. § 4-105(3)
(1990). The term "drawee" is the Article 3 equivalent. See iU. § 3-103(a)(3).
Articles 3 and 4 will be hereinafter cited as either "Original" or "Revised."
"Original" refers to the 1989 version of the Code: "Revised" refers to the 1990 version.
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and revised Codes, vis-A-vis its customer, the payor bank as an initial
matter bears the loss because such items are not considered "properly
payable."'  Similarly, the payor bank is liable in conversion to the
owner of an instrument when it pays an instrument bearing a forged
indorsement.' 4 The payor bank then may seek to recover from
prior transferors for breach of presentment warranties made by those
transferors.225
The original versions of Articles 3 and 4 implemented a
contributory negligence scheme for allocating losses when a party's
negligence contributed to the loss. The Code accomplished this by
providing that only a bank that had acted with ordinary care could
assert the negligent conduct of another party as a defense.226 Thus,
for example; if a payor bank's customer was asserting that the bank
paid a check bearing an unauthorized drawer's signature, the bank
could only assert the negligence of the customer as a defense if the
223. See U.C.C. § 4-401 (Revised); U.C.C. § 4-401 (Original).
224. See U.C.C. § 3-420(a) (Revised); U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c) (Original).
225. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-208 (Revised); U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1), 4-207(l) (Original).
Application of the UCC causes of action leads to the general result, absent a valid defense,
that the payor bank will bear the loss in the case of a forged or unauthorized drawer's
signature, because transferors only warrant to the payor bank that they have no knowledge
that the signature of the drawer is unauthorized. See U.C.C. § 4-208(a)(3) (Revised);
U.C.C. § 4-207(1)(b) (Original). The payor bank rarely will be successful in showing that
warrantors have the requisite knowledge, and thus will bear the loss. In the case of forged
indorsements and alterations, however, the first party who dealt with the thief generally
will bear the loss because all transferors warrant absolutely to their transferees and to the
payor bank that there are no forged indorsements or alterations. See U.C.C. §§ 4-207(a),
4-208(a) (Revised); U.C.C. § 4-207(1)-(2) (Original). Thus, in the latter types of cases, the
payor bank's warranty action will be successful and the loss will be shifted upstream.
226. See U.C.C. §§ 3-406,4-406 (Original). Those sections accomplished the intended
contributory negligence standard by providing, in the case of § 3-406, that a party whose
negligence substantially contributed to the making of an unauthorized signature or a
material alteration was precluded from asserting an unauthorized signature or alteration,
as applicable, against "a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's
business." Id. § 3-406. Under § 4-406 a bank could not raise the negligent failure of its
customer to examine bank statements as provided by that section "if the customer
establishe[d] lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s)." Id. § 4-
406(3). Thus, only banks that had paid the instrument in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards, id. § 3-406, or had exercised ordinary care, id- § 4-406, could assert
those defenses and shift the loss back to the party raising the action. Whether § 3-405 also
implemented a contributory negligence standard was a matter of debate. Original § 3-405,
the "fictitious payee rule," failed to state that it applied only when the drawee or payor
bank had acted with ordinary care. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank,
371 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (finding bank's failure to exercise ordinary care
irrelevant for § 3-405 purposes).
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bank itself had acted with ordinary care. If so, the bank could shift
the entire loss back onto the negligent customer, assuming that the
customer's behavior fell within the scope of the defenses provided by
the original Code.
The core idea of the original Code's loss allocation scheme was
that the payor bank was in the best position to have prevented the
loss from a forged drawer's signature because it could examine the
signature of the drawer on the signature card on file with the bank.
However, heavy volume and an increasingly mechanized system of
check collection had impelled some banks to limit or omit entirely
sight examination of checks presented for payment. Extensive
litigation under the loss allocation provisions addressed the issue of
whether a payor bank that had failed to examine the instrument had
exercised ordinary care in paying an instrument, and thus could assert
the negligence of another party. The original Code did give some
limited guidance on the issue by providing that action or inaction that
was consistent with "general banking usage" constituted prima facie
exercise of ordinary care.' In spite of this language, some courts
indicated that, regardless of any general bank practices or usages, a
bank's failure to conduct a sight examination of every instrument per
se constituted a lack of ordinary care.' Other courts paid greater
attention to banking usage in order to ascertain whether a limited
sight review or failure to conduct any sight review nonetheless could
constitute exercise of ordinary care. Judicial attitudes were largely
irreconcilable, with some courts finding that a limited review of items
over only a set dollar amount could constitute ordinary care if other
institutions in the area had similar procedures.29  Other courts
found a similar dollar cut-off but with no random examination of
items under that amount could constitute a lack of ordinary care,"0
227. U.C.C. § 4-103(3) (Original).
228. See Hanover Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501,506 (D. Kan.
1979); Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149, 155 (Conn. 1976); Jackson
v. First Nat'l Bank, 403 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966), overruled by Vending
Chattanooga, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tenn. 1987);
see also Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 295-96 (1st
Cir. 1988) (discussing precedent implying such a result).
229. See, e.g., Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 552 N.E.2d 783,787
(I11. 1990) (finding sight review only of checks over $1000 to be a triable issue of fact in
exercising ordinary care).
230. See, e.g., Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329, 332 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding policy of sight review only of checks over $5000 as failing bank's
statutory responsibility).
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and still others found a dollar cut-off together with random examina-
tion of checks for lesser amounts could constitute exercise of ordinary
care.
23 1
The revisions to Articles 3 and 4 retain the underlying structure
of the original provisions but significantly abandon the contributory
negligence scheme in favor of comparative negligence. As with the
prior law, Articles 3 and 4 begin with the basic rule that the payor
bank is liable if it pays an instrument that contains an unauthorized
signature or alteration. 2  Thus, the payor bank still bears the loss
as an initial matter. Yet, the revisions expand the defenses that a
payor bank may raise. First, with respect to a forged indorsement,
the payor bank may claim that the indorsement is effective under
either section 3-44' 3 or section 3-405.3  The payor bank also
may assert that a customer's lack of ordinary care that substantially
contributed to the making of an unauthorized signature or an
alteration ought to preclude the person from raising the unauthorized
signature or alteration." Finally, the payor bank may attempt to
claim that its customer's failure to examine a bank statement
promptly ought to preclude the customer from asserting its unautho-
rized signature or an alteration. 6  Unlike prior law, the revisions
omit the requirement that the bank have acted with ordinary care in
order to raise these defenses. 7 Rather, upon satisfactory proof of
a relevant defense, the loss shifts back to the party who initially
asserted the improper payment.' That party then bears the burden
of proving that the bank, too, failed to exercise ordinary care and that
231. Zapata, 848 F.2d at 294-95 (finding sight review of checks over $1000 and random
exam of checks less than $1000 to satisfy ordinary care).
232. U.C.C. §§ 3-420, 4-401 (Revised).
233. Section 3-404 of the revised UCC renders an indorsement effective in favor of a
person who, in good faith, has paid the instrument or has taken it for value or collection
when, inter alia, (1) an impostor has induced the issuer of the instrument to issue the
instrument to the impostor, id. § 3-404(a), (2) the person whose intent determines to whom
the instrument is payable does not intend the payee to have any interest in the instrument,
id. § 3-404(b)(i). or (3) the payee is a fictitious person, id. § 3-404(b)(ii).
234. Section 3-405 of the revised UCC renders an indorsement effective in favor of a
person who, in good faith, has paid the instrument or has taken it for value or collection
when an employer entrusts an employee with responsibility with respect to instruments and
the employee makes a fraudulent indorsement of the instrument. Id § 3-405(b).
235. Id. § 3-406.
236. d. § 4-406.
237. See id.; U.C.C. § 4-406 (Original).
238. See U.C.C. §§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b), 3-406(b), 4-406(e) (Revised).
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the loss ought to be allocated according to the parties' respective
fault. 9 Although under the revisions the loss initially is placed
upon the payor bank, it may raise an expanded number of defenses
to shift the loss back to the party asserting improper payment
irrespective of the bank's lack of ordinary care. That party, usually
a bank's customer, then must prove the bank's lack of ordinary care
in order to shift some of the loss back to the bank.
The definition of the bank's duty of ordinary care also has
substantially changed from the duty imposed by some case law that
had developed prior to the revisions. According to the revisions, the
general duty of ordinary care means not only observance of reason-
able commercial standards, but also
In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for processing
for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable
commercial standards do not require the bank to examine
the instrument if the failure to examine does not violate the
bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do
not vary unreasonably from general banking usage not
disapproved by [Article 3] or Article 4.2'
With this swift move the body of case law, which had found a bank
to have per se failed to exercise ordinary care if it failed to examine
an instrument for forgeries,24 had been overruled.
It has been claimed that these changes represent not only a
substantial loss to consumers but, concomitantly, evidence of industry
domination of the revision process.242 It is important first to note
the types of fact situations in which the loss allocation provisions of
Articles 3 and 4 become germane. The litigation most often is
between a bank, or group of banks, and a business whose faithless
employee has embezzled large amounts of money.243 The sight
examination requirement in effect acted to insulate businesses from
significant fraud losses by barring a payor bank from raising the
businesses' negligence on the sole basis of failure to comply with a
practice that largely had become out of date. Accordingly, those with
239. Id.
240. Id. § 3-103(a)(7).
241. See supra note 228-and accompanying text.
242. See generally Patchel, supra note 3, at 110-20 (disapproving of interest group
influence over UCC revision).
243. See, e.g., Zapata, 848 F.2d at 292 (concerning employee theft); Wilder Binding, 552
N.E.2d at 784 (concerning bookkeeper embezzlement); Medford Irrigation, 676 P.2d at 331
(concerning bookkeeper embezzlement).
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the greatest interest in retaining the sight evaluation requirement
imposed by some courts were businesses rather than consumers.
Evidence suggests that those parties most interested in the change
were adequately represented at the drafting stage.2' It is hard to
see how the revisions' sanctioning of no sight review-only when "it
does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures"'24 and only when
it does "not vary unreasonably from general banking usage"2 -can
therefore be viewed as a conspiracy against consumers when corporate
interests were the interests most negatively affected by the change.
Admittedly, a few consumers might be worse off due to the new
definition of "ordinary care." A recent critic of the revisions suggests
that fully informed customers-implying ordinary consumers-would
object strenuously to the change.247 Yet, no cases or empirical
evidence are provided to indicate that sight examination inured to the
benefit of consumers-rather than negligent businesses-or that banks
were abusing rights granted to them by the Code in a manner
adversely affecting consumers. Applying the revised Code provisions,
the consumers most affected by the new definition of ordinary care
and the comparative negligence scheme are those consumers who (1)
are negligent themselves in contributing to the scheme;2 (2) either
reside in jurisdictions that found a failure to conduct sight examina-
tion was a per se lack of ordinary care249 or write extremely large
checks that fell over the bank's cut-off for sight examination-an
unlikely circumstance in the case of consumer check writing hab-
its; and (3) are the victims of an on-going forgery scheme."s
244. See generally Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3 (describing the revision
process of Articles 3 and 4).
245. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (Revised).
246. 1d
247. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 117 n.168 ("Certainly a reasonable customer might
be willing to pay a small share of $125,000 in order to avoid the possibility of bearing the
entire burden of a $109,000 loss."); l. at 133-34 (consumers would object to the revisions).
Professor Patchel provides no data indicating that any consumers have been forced to bear
a $109,000 loss under the Code's loss allocation rules.
248. This is because consumers who are not negligent are always successful. The bank's
duty of ordinary care is only applicable when the bank wishes to assert the negligence of
another party. See U.C.C. § 4-406(e) (Revised).
249. Thus, under the original provisions, the bank could not assert the negligence of the
consumer. Under the revisions, the consumer now will bear the loss absent proof of bank
negligence not related to the mere absence of sight review.
250. Checks under the cut-off amounts were not reviewed and thus the consumer
received no benefit from sight review.
251. A one-shot forgery is not likely to result in consumer liability because (1) § 4-
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One wonders whether the changes affect consumers in such a serious
manner as critics claim or whether all consumers would wish to
subsidize these negligent consumers through codifying a sight
evaluation requirement. At the same time, the costs of maintaining
a sight examination procedure to prevent a bank from being held
liable to a negligent business entity for enormous fraud losses, and of
litigating the sight review requirement, most likely were passed on to
the bank's customers, including their individual consumer customers.
Some commentators also claim that the revisions' new loss
allocation scheme is inefficient and does not strike an appropriate
balance among the competing policies that loss allocation issues
raise2 2 These arguments also are unpersuasive. As argued in the
previous section, the policy model upon which these critiques of the
comparative negligence scheme rely is erroneous. At the same time,
the contextual rules model of Code drafting illuminates the value and
validity of the new comparative negligence provisions. The move
from contributory to comparative negligence accurately reflects the
changes in tort law that have ensued since enactment of the old
versions of Articles 3 and 4. Reliance upon general tort principles
provides an easily understandable conceptual framework for judicial
dispute resolution. The revisions to the definition of ordinary care
reflect the actual practice of financial institutions in processing and
paying checks by automated means. Finally, the new comparative
negligence provisions allow for the expansion and development of the
UCC through judicial interpretation of the new provisions. The loss
allocation rules thus reflect actual practice and law, encourage
development of the area, and promise fairly uniform enactment by the
states.
Imagine that a proposal for an entirely efficient, fair method of
loss allocation 3 had been offered by the NCCUSL to the state
406(d) precludes a customer from raising an unauthorized signature most often in cases
where the same wrongdoer continues to forge checks over a period of time, see infra note
275, and (2) § 3-406's preclusion most often will be factually inapplicable, or difficult to
prove, in the case of a one-shot forgery. Section 3-404 is rarely applicable in consumer
cases, and § 3-405 is entirely inapplicable.
252. See generally Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3 (arguing that revisions are
inequitable and fail to achieve a policy of economic efficiency).
253. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 138. Professors Cooter and Rubin assert that
three principles of efficiency ought to govern the design of any loss allocation system. The
loss spreading principle assigns liability to the party that can achieve risk neutrality at the
lowest cost. Id. at 70-73. The loss reduction principle assigns liability to the party that can
reduce losses at the lowest cost. Id. at 73-77. Finally, the loss imposition principle
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legislatures. For example, the drafters could have adopted a loss
allocation framework that set a specific dollar limit for consumer
losses irrespective of negligence, an approach adopted at the federal
level for some noncheck based payment systems. Suppose that
the official draft of Articles. 3 and 4 as presented to the states
contained a loss limit of fifty dollars in the case of consumers.55
Certainly this approach would have increased the possibility of
nonuniform enactment, as interest groups lobbied the legislatures
either to omit the provisions entirely, or to raise or lower the dollar
threshold depending upon local customs. At the same time, the
rigidity of the proposed dollar threshold would have undermined the
longevity of the Code. Changed circumstances might present an
argument for changing the initial sum, requiring nonuniform amend-
ments on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. This continual political
pressure on fifty separate state legislatures obviously has not only
monetary costs but also costs such as lost legislator time, which
presumably could be devoted to more pressing social issues.
Thus, an analysis of the revised Code's loss allocation scheme
does not indicate that it is adverse to consumers in any significant
respect. The forms of the rules themselves do not indicate significant
interest group domination applying recent public choice hypotheses
concerning the product of the drafting process0'6 Moreover, the
scheme is consistent with the context in which those rules are to
apply. Finally, its inefficiencies, for the large part, are a matter for
the legislatures rather than the NCCUSL.
mandates that enforcement be as inexpensive as possible. Id. at 78-84. This Article does
not join issue with the Rubin and Cooter view that, in an ideal world, application of these
principles might lead to a loss allocation scheme that perfectly balanced the efficiency and
equity concerns raised by the problem of losses in the payment system.
254. For example, consumers are liable only for the first $50 of loss due to an
unauthorized use of a credit card. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1994). Consumer liability for
unauthorized electronic funds transfers is tiered. Basic liability is $50, see 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.6(b) (1995), but can rise to $500 if the consumer fails to notify the institution after
discovering a theft of the ATM card or PIN number, see id. § 205.6(b)(1), or can be
unlimited for unauthorized transfers occurring after the consumer neglects to report
unauthorized transfers which appeared on the consumer's periodic statement, see id.
§ 205.6(b)(2).
255. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (capping credit card losses at $50).
256. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9. Professors Schwartz and Scott hypothesize
that industry group domination is evidenced by production of "Model 1" bright-line rules.
Id. at 638. However, the loss allocation provisions are characterized principally by their
use of vague standards of "ordinary care" and "reasonableness"-evidence of lesser
industry influence.
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B. Bank/Depositor Relations
A second point of major contention in the revisions to Articles
3 and 4 lies in those Articles' claimed anticonsumer attitude toward
the bank/depositor relationship. In addition to being relieved of
subsidizing a judicially imposed sight evaluation requirement, which
acted principally to benefit grossly negligent corporations who failed
to supervise properly their employees, consumers also receive many
benefits from the revisions in this area.
As a general matter, the relationship between a bank and its
customer is treated by the UCC as a matter of general contract
law. 7 Great latitude is given to the principle of freedom of con-
tract under section 4-103(a), which provides:
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by
agreement, but the parties to the agreement cannot disclaim
a bank's responsibility for its lack of good faith or failure to
exercise ordinary care or limit the measure of damages for
the lack or failure. However, the parties may determine by
agreement the standards by which the bank's responsibility
is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly
unreasonable2 8
This broad validation of freedom of contract is, and has always
been, one of the most controversial provisions of Article 4.9
Consumers ordinarily do not examine their deposit agreement closely
upon opening a checking account, if they examine it at all. The
bank/depositor agreement is a quintessential adhesion contract. The
continuing presence of section 4-103 in the UCC has fueled some
objections to the revisions.2 The existence of the nearly identical
provision in the final version of the original Article 4 in fact swayed
Grant Gilmore to oppose enactment of that Article in its entirety.
2 61
Those who rely upon Gilmore's objections to this section fail to note
the ambiguity that surrounded his concerns:
257. See U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (Revised) ("A bank may charge against the account of a
customer an item that is properly payable from the account even though the charge creates
an overdraft. An item is properly payable if it is authorized by the customer and is in
accordance with any agreement between the customer and bank.").
258. ld. § 4-103(a).
259. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 111 (discussing Gilmore's objections to § 4-103).
260. See id.; Rubin, Efficiency and Equity, supra note 3, at 555-56 (noting criticism of
Article 4).
261. Gilmore, supra note 159,-at 375-77.
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Let us not overstate the case. I do not believe that it is
time to man the barricades. Our way of life will not be in
jeopardy even if Article 4 is enacted. Luncheon at the
Bankers' Club is not given over to devising ways and means
of hoisting the poor customer each day a little higher on his
own petard. I do not ascribe to the draftsmen of the final
version of Article 4 motives which are in any way improper
or malevolent.
A cheap, speedy and efficient collection system is in the
private interest of banks as much as it is in the public
interest of customers of banks. We may anticipate that in
general and in good times banks would use the powers
conferred on them under § 4-103 in a good faith effort to
improve the collection system. But there are bad times as
well as good times; there may even be bad banks as well as
good banks. Section 4-103 goes far beyond what is wise or
permissible in allowing banks to rewrite the law their way
whenever things get tough ... 2
Consumer representatives have presented scant empirical
evidence that banks have significantly abused the freedom of contract
granted to them under original section 4-103. Presumably, over the
forty years from UCC past to UCC present, abundant evidence
should exist to support the view that financial institutions have been
abusing this privilege in a manner unchecked by legal interven-
21tion. 6 Certainly if they have been,, a wealth of case law, consumertestimony, and empirical data would unveil these practices and
262. Id. at 376-77.
263. One area where financial institutions got a bit frisky was with respect to funds
availability. Institutions instituted a practice of restricting withdrawals of deposited funds,
as long as three weeks-15 business days-in the case of some checks. This was ostensibly
because some deposited checks ultimately might prove to be uncollectable, a legitimate
concern for the depository institution. In practice, though, institutions in effect got free
use of the depositor's money during most of the hold period. Litigation on the issue often
focused on § 4-103. See, e.g., Rapp v. Dime Say. Bank, 408 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1978)
(finding in favor of bank), affd, 396 N.E.2d 740 (1979). These practices led to enactment
of the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987,12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994), and to the
Federal Reserve Board's promulgation of Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1995).
Regulation CC contains detailed rules on the time limits for when a bank must make
deposited funds available to its customer. See id. §§ 229.10, 229.12. It further has rules
for an expedited return obligation for unpaid checks. See, e.g., id. § 229.30 (establishing
guidelines that paying banks must follow). These are not popular regulations in the
financial community. Perhaps the banks have learned that kittenish play with § 4-103
rights might lead to unpopular, onerous, and costly federal regulation.
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buttress the consumer activists' claims. Critics of Article 4 provide
little such evidence. In Gilmore's words, perhaps the objectors tend
to "overstate the case." In the years following original Article 4,
consumers in fact have won significant victories in the courts by
arguing for expansion of the doctrines of unconscionability2  and
good faith and fair dealing into the bank/depositor contractual
relationship. Instead of the parade of horribles Gilmore alluded to in
his discussion of section 4-103, the legal system in the years between
original Article 4 and its revisions appears adequately-albeit
imperfectly-to have been accommodating the tensions between
section 4-103 and the adhesion relationship established by the
bank/depositor agreement.
Nor does the revisions' treatment of these pro-consumer
developments in the interim indicate a significant desire to take away
rights given earlier by the courts. In many respects the revisions
legitimate, and sometimes even expand upon, those developments.
For example, judicial cases approving of the use of unconscionability
and good faith and fair dealing to protect consumers are mentioned
in the comments to section 4-401.266 In a significant consumer
victory, the definition of good faith has been expanded from the
definition in original Articles 3 and 4. The original Articles defined
good faith solely as "honesty in fact."2 67 Many courts have narrowly
interpreted this definition to require that the bank must only be
subjectively honest in its dealings with its customer.' The revisions
alter the definition to include not only honesty in fact but also
264. E.g., Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1985) (allowing unconscionability claim to be raised in an action to invalidate fees set
by a bank).
265. E.g., Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987) (holding a bank's
breach of good faith in setting fees to be a triable issue of fact).
266. See U.C.C. § 4-401 cnt. 3 (Revised).
This Act does not regulate fees that banks charge their customers ... but under
principles of law such as unconscionability or good faith and fair dealing, courts
have reviewed fees and the bank's exercise of discretion to set fees. In addition,
Section 1-203 provides that every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.
Ia. (citations omitted).
267. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989).
268. See, ag., First Interstate Bank v. Wilkerson, 876 P.2d 326,329 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)
(applying subjective state-of-mind standard and rejecting objective standards of
reasonableness and fairness); see also Overby, supra note 102, at 972-73 (discussing
subjective, objective, and mixed judicial approaches to "honesty in fact" definition of good
faith).
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"observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing"'269
and indicate in the commentary that the new objective standard of
"fair dealing" imposes on banks a duty to act "fairly" toward their
customers.27 Although the expanded definition will act to benefit
a bank's business clients, certainly ordinary consumers will be
beneficiaries of the revised definition of good faith as well.
The revised Code's attitude toward "check truncation" and
related issues also has been cited as representing the revisions'
substantial bias toward business interests.27 As check collection
technology has advanced, the physical transfer envisioned by original
Article 4 of checks from bank to bank along a convoluted collection
chain is becoming more and more dated. These changes, along with
considerations of expense, have impelled some institutions to consider
returning monthly statements without the actual checks drawn by the
customer. Under the Code the customer has a duty to review the
statement for unauthorized payments due to an unauthorized
customer's signature or an alteration.2' Failure to discover the
unauthorized payment will result in precluding the customer from
raising, in some very limited instances, the unauthorized payment.273
The emerging practice of retaining the physical checks obviously bears
significantly on this duty. The revisions handle the problem by
providing that a customer's duty only arises if the bank sends or
makes available a statement and either returns or makes available the
items paid to the customer or provides "information in the statement
of account sufficient to allow the customer reasonably to identify the
items paid."274 Information is sufficient if it is "described by item
number, amount, and date of payment."' 75 If the requisite state-
269. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (Revised).
270. i § 3-103 cmt. 4.
271. See Patchel, supra note 3, at 118-20, 134.
272. U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (Revised). The general duty is to "exercise reasonable
promptness in examining the statement." Id.
273. lt § 4-406(d). The preclusion will arise with respect to the customer's
unauthorized signature or to alterations (1) on an item reflected in the statement only if
the bank can prove it "suffered a loss" because of the customer's failure properly to
examine the statement, id. § 4-406(d)(1), or (2) on items by the same wrongdoer paid in
good faith by the bank after the first statement was made available to the customer for a
reasonable period not exceeding 30 days, id. § 4-406(d)(2).
274. Id. § 4-406(a).
275. Id. The addition of this requirement into revised Article 4 is unfortunate for
reasons entirely unrelated to consumer fairness. The requirement grounds the rule in the
immediate present and allows little future judicial development of the overall general
requirement that information be "sufficient." Practices and technology might change in
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ment and information is sent; the customer's duty to inspect arises,
and, "[i]f, based on the statement or items provided, the customer
should reasonably have discovered the unauthorized payment, the
customer must promptly notify the bank of the relevant facts."276
It has been claimed that these revisions "create[] a hardship for
bank customers who keep less than perfect records,"2' and would
be strenuously objected to by consumers if they had the ability to
understand the changes. 27 8  It is questionable whether consumers
who keep sloppy records ought to merit sympathy in the revision
process. The issues raised by check truncation do not fall so neatly
into bank versus consumer lines. Consumers who keep good records
conceivably might object to subsidizing the sloppy practices of
marginal consumers who have been given additional time279 in which
to perform this relatively simple task before any significant liability is
imposed by the Code. In addition, the limited nature of the bank's
rights, should it elect to omit physical return of items, undermines the
strength of these pro-consumer arguments. Should the bank provide
the relevant, albeit limited data, the customer has a duty to discover
only those unauthorized payments that reasonably could have been
discovered based on the statement or items provided.2" Finally, it
is the bank who initially bears the loss for an unauthorized signa-
ture,2" it is the bank who has the burden of proving that customers
ways that either would render this rule obsolete or make another approach more
appealing.
276. Id. § 4-406(c).
277. Patchel, supra note 3, at 119.
278. See id. at 134 ("If [consumers] knew that these revisions mean they probably no
longer will receive their canceled checks with their statement, and thus will be required
to discover forged checks from their statements alone... consumers might get a little hot
under the collar."). Consumer representatives' rhetoric is misleading. True, a customer
cannot discover a "forged check" in a statement that'does not include the returned checks.
The wrongful act is not the forged check, however, but rather the unauthorized payment
by the payor bank. Sanctioning no return of checks does take away one sign that
represents the wrong or harm-the physical instrument-but it does not in any manner
attempt to alter a bank's liability for the wrongful act. The only question is whether the
statement contains sufficient information to allow a consumer to determine whether a
harm has occurred.
279. See U.C.C. § 4-406(d)(2) (Revised) (expanding "same wrongdoer rule" time period
to 30 days).
280. Il § 4-406(c). To quell consumer lobbyist concerns about § 4-406, a few states
have reiterated this in the official comments, even though it is stated in the text of the
statute. See Hillebrand, A New Focus, supra note 8, at 126 & n.1 I (noting Pennsylvania
and California amendments and comments to § 4-406).
281. See supra text accompanying note 232.
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failed to exercise their duties to examine the statement,' and given
the limited nature of the preclusion that applies should the bank
surmount those difficulties,' it is the bank who most likely will
bear the loss in most cases. Thus, it is questionable that the Code's
treatment of these issues represents a substantial bias toward financial
institutions and against consumers.
Economic analysis and research into the ways in which legislation
can be designed to accommodate inequalities in bargaining power and
barriers to raising rights in the judicial system admittedly provide
interesting possibilities for commercial law. Yet, the real issue is
whether those possibilities ought to be reflected in the UCC, rather
than in state or federal legislation. For example, the UCC takes no
approach on fee regulation other than through the general rubrics of
unconscionability and good faith and fair dealing. 4 Whether fee
regulation could be accomplished without destroying uniformity is
highly debatable. Requiring institutions to adhere to a set procedure
for returning items' to their customers also significantly threatens
largely uniform enactment because of interest-group pressures on
state legislatures and because those procedures are only in their
infancy and, if codified, would do little more than ground the Code
in a technology that soon will become out of date. State-by-state
nonuniform amendments or federal preemption would then be
required to bring the Code up to date.
The drafters' attitude to the bank/depositor relationship also is
largely consistent with the contextual rules model of the drafting
process. The revisions attempt to resolve fairly consumer-related
issues that evoked considerable litigation under the doctrines of
unconscionability and good faith. Technological changes and
commercial practices that have emerged along with check truncation
are accommodated in a manner not significantly adverse to consumer
interests. The revisions' reluctance to transcend context and take a
more activist and regulatory stance on consumer issues such as fee
regulation is defensible under the model. The overall approach taken
by the revisions not only reflects many consumer victories and the law
282. See U.C.C. § 4406(d) (Revised) ("If the bank proves that the customer failed, with
respect to an item, to comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (c)
8. S).
283. See supra note 273.
284. See supra note 266.
285. See, eg., Patchel, supra note 3, at 119 (implying that the Code ought to require a
bank to provide checkbooks with carbon copies).
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as it has developed to date, but also promises to result in largely
uniform enactment.
Finally, as with the new loss allocation rules, the forms of the
rules themselves-which are articulated in broad terms of good faith,
fairness, and reasonableness--do not indicate significant interest
group domination, applying recent public choice hypotheses concern-
ing the drafting process. 6 Charges that the revisions represent a
failure of the UCC drafting process, are substantially biased against
consumers, and evidence the financial industry capture of the drafting
committee are therefore grossly overstated, if not entirely unwarrant-
ed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Human nature perhaps always compels that "[w]e instinctively
think of codification as a noble experiment: radical in its inspiration,
reformist in its aims, rational in its methods."'  The ongoing
process of revising the UCC has sparked again the call for revolution
and reform in commercial law. The controversy that has ensued from
the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 revisits the conflict between
expectation and experience that inherently underlies every codifica-
tion process. That the revisions are neither radical, reformist, nor
completely rational ought not come as a great surprise.
It has been argued that the revisions are flawed because they
represent industry group domination of the revision process and
because they do not incorporate policy-oriented provisions such as
consumer protection regulations that would have been in the public
interest. These arguments first proceed on the underlying assumption
that substantial agreement exists on the proper scope of the UCC
revision effort. As discussed in this Article, that assumption is
incorrect. The arguments also assume that public interest theory
provides a satisfactory framework in which to evaluate the revisions.
However, the public interest is a meaningless, vague, and transitory
concept that is highly inappropriate for evaluating the NCCUSL
lawmaking effort and ought to be abandoned. In its place principles
such as political accountability, inclusion, and uniformity which
advance the legislative values underlying the private uniform laws
286. See supra note 256.
287. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instnments, 13 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 441, 456 (1979).
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process ought to be used to assess any proposed model for the UCC
revision process.
As this Article has argued, under the preferred model of Code
drafting-the contextual rules model-the drafters of the revisions to
Articles 3 and 4 did not wander too far from their proper role.
Charges that the revision process represents an evident corruption of
the NCCUSL and ALI ought therefore be viewed with a great deal
of skepticism. In their continued effort to preserve the integrity of
the law, the bank lawyers rather ironically might be viewed as the
heroes of theArticle 4 tale. 9 Yet, it seems that the policy model
of UCC drafting is attaining and will continue to attain greater accep-
tance. The pursuit of balance, efficiency, equity, or whichever social
policy, reform, or legal theory is of fashion at the moment, will guide
how we go about constructing our new Code. The value of the
contextual rules model, then, is perhaps only that it amplifies in the
uneasy pause which presages any radical and revolutionary step
forward, a whisper that something grand may be lost.
288. Cf. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 3, at 768-81 ("They preferred
promulgating a well-formulated, familiar-looking statute, brimming with integrity.").
289. See supra text accompanying notes 158-75.
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